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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Hegel’s critique of abstract labor in the Philosophy of Right and the
sections on objective spirit in the Encyclopaedia. Against both Frederick Neuhouser’s and
Marxist interpretations, I argue that abstract labor, for Hegel, characterizes the specific kind of
mechanical labor undertaken in the nineteenth-century factory. Such repetitive labor, Hegel
claims, leads to the deadening (Abstumpfung) of the worker through the deforming of her ethical
subjectivity, a social pathology he hopes will be resolved by machine automation. By developing
two key aspects of Hegel’s social theory—that labor produces ethical subjectivity or education
(Bildung) and that this education is the central locus of civil society’s ethicality—I argue that we
ought to understand Hegel’s hope for machine automation as a critique of those forms of labor
which prevent the worker’s rational participation in the totality of the labor process and thus fail
to actualize her social freedom.
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1

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I seek to critically examine the answers that we find in G. W. F. Hegel’s
(1770–1831) mature political writings—the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Elements of
Philosophy of Right), first published in 1820,1 and the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen
Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline), first
published in 1817 with second and third editions appearing in 1827 and 1830, respectively—to a
broad set of questions regarding the role of labor in modern societies: why must we, as citizens
of a modern state, secure ourselves a line of work in order to live a properly ethical life? What
kind of subject is enculturated, formed, and educated by and for this required labor? And what
kinds of labor processes and labor-related institutions count as successfully establishing ethical
subject-formation? While Hegel is usually taken to hold a commonplace or even conservative
view of labor and its institutional arrangement, affirming, critics say, the strict Protestant work
ethic found in Kant and analyzed by Weber, my contention is that this interpretation of Hegel is
fundamentally challenged by a close reading of his critique of abstract labor and his endorsement
of machine automation as the immanent solution to the rising tide of the unskilled and repetitive
labor nascent within his industrializing nineteenth-century European milieu.
While Hegel’s critique of abstract labor illuminates many of the compelling aspects of his
theory of labor, such as its disruption of any straightforward distinction between the political and
the economic aspects of modern society, its careful interweaving of the interest of the individual
with those of a more universal bent, and its insistence on the irreducibility of substantial norms
in any ethical evaluation of the labor process (and is thus a worthy object of inquiry for Hegel

1

While the published edition was dated 1821 (PR xlvii), the Philosophy of Right was in fact published in
1820 (PR xxxv). Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M.
Knox and Stephen Houlgate (Oxford University Press, 2008), x.
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scholarship in its own right), the set of immediate political concerns it addresses is also very
much our own. Today, the ethical status of labor is in crisis. The most industrialized economies
are now facing a new wave of automation in spheres usually understood to be immune to it, such
as the service, retail, and transportation industries. This has led many political theorists to seek
out alternative ways of distributing not just the fruits of productive labor conceived as the result
of social cooperation but also labor itself, generating a revitalized interest in policy proposals
such as universal basic income,2 the reduction of the working week, mandated automation,3
publically guaranteed jobs,4 state-funded job training,5 and so on—all of which directly
challenge the primacy and independence of labor in the formation of ethical subjectivity.
Universal basic income and other calls for further automation even question the very necessity of
labor for ethical subject-formation, rejecting the very desirability of the work ethic which
permeates much of the history Western social and political thought.
This thesis addresses these contemporary concerns by asking whether there are any
Hegelian resources for conceptualizing these kinds of political demands in the name of
actualizing social freedom at an institutional level. While a full response to this broad question
requires an analysis of these demands on their own terms and is thus outside the scope of this

2

For a recent overview of the varieties of universal basic income, arguments in its favor, and responses to
several standard criticisms, see Philippe van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical
Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy (Harvard University Press, 2017).
3
For a recent overview of proposals for a reduction in the working week and increased automation (in
addition to universal basic income) from a leftist perspective, see Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams,
Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (Verso, 2015).
4
E.g., Bernie Sanders’ proposal for state-guaranteed employment for workers unable to find a job. Jeff
Stein, “Bernie Sanders to Announce Plan to Guarantee Every American a Job,” The Washington Post,
April 23, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/23/bernie-sanders-to-unveilplan-to-guarantee-every-american-a-job.
5
E.g., Barack Obama’s push for state-sponsored job skills training through the Workforce Innovation and
Opportunity Act. Gregory Korte, “Obama Signs Bill to Overhaul Job Training Programs,” USA Today,
July 22, 2014. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/07/22/obama-job-trainingbill/12987339.
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historically oriented thesis, I argue that Hegel’s encounter with machine automation permits us to
respond with a provisional yes, primarily because of his insight that we cannot remain blind to
the inner-workings of particular jobs and labor processes, i.e., their content and quality, in
evaluating their normative desirability at a political-institutional level.6 The quality of one’s
labor is ethically significant because it fundamentally shapes the Bildung or ethical subjectivity
of its undertaker, and does so not just at the idealist heights of one’s self-conception but even at
the material base of one’s habituated and embodied “being-together-with-one’s-own-self” (EM
§410A). This moment of Hegel’s general critique of moral and economic formalism invites us,
alongside Marx, into the hidden abode of production so that we may question the desirability of
institutions which encourage and support the existence of, say, numerous meta-search engines
for wealthy tourists, the proliferation of messaging and networking platforms which profit
primarily off of their users’ unpaid labor, or the any number of “bullshit jobs” 7 which occupy the
time and concern of large swaths of the working population of the increasingly
“deindustrialized” economies of Western countries.8 In this way, Hegel’s two-sided ethical
treatment of labor which identifies both labor’s contributions to subjective Bildung and its
radical inability to prevent subjective deformation—an acknowledgement, in other words, of
both the market’s irreducible importance as well as its fundamental limits—has particular
contemporary relevance.

Hegel calls the state’s institutional arrangement its political constitution, which he understands as also
including the political attitude of the its citizens (PR §§260–270).
7
David Graeber, “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs: A Work Rant,” Strike, August 2013,
https://strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs. See also David Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory (Simon & Schuster,
2018).
8
Wolfgang Streeck, “How will Capitalism End?,” New Left Review 87 (2014): 35f.
6
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Before turning to Hegel’s text, however, I would like to position my interpretive project
more explicitly among contemporary Anglophone scholarship on Hegel’s political philosophy
and social theory. The most influential study of labor in the interpretation of Hegel’s thought in
the twentieth century has been Alexandre Kojève’s (1902–1968) lectures on the Phenomenology
of Spirit delivered at the Sorbonne between 1934 and 1939.9 Influenced by both the young
Marx’s recently published notebooks—the so-called Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
of 1844—as well as Heideggerian existentialism, Kojève’s lectures extend the role of labor and
recognition developed in the Phenomenology’s master-slave dialectic to characterize the inner
core of Hegel’s conception of history and, ultimately, the whole of his social and political
thought. “All of History—that is, the whole ‘movement’ of human existence in the natural
World,” Kojève writes, “is nothing but the progressive negation of Slavery by the Slave, the
series of his successive ‘conversions’ to Freedom [through Work].”10
My interpretation of the role of labor in Hegel’s politics, however, fundamentally differs
from that of Kojève’s and his followers’, as my focus is on Hegel’s mature political thought as
he develops it in the Philosophy of Right and, to a lesser degree, the sections on objective spirit
in the Encyclopaedia. Kojève, in contrast, takes an exclusive interest in the Phenomenology of
Spirit, which, alongside other Marxists readers of Hegel of the day such as Georg Lukács (1885–

9

Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit,
trans. Raymond Queneau (Cornell University Press, 1980).
10
Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 225. Kojève discusses the importance of labor in the
master-slave dialectic throughout the famous first chapter (3–30). See also 144f: “It is Work, and only
Work, that transforms the World in an essential manner, by creating truly new realities.” For critical
discussions of Kojève’s reading as it pertains to the Philosophy of Right, see Anders Bartonek, “Labour
Against Capitalism? Hegel’s Concept of Labour in Between Civil Society and the State,” Culture
Unbound 6, no. 1 (2014): 120 and Giorgio Cesarale, “Hegel’s Notion of Abstract Labor in the Elements
of the Philosophy of Right,” in Hegel and Capitalism, ed. Andrew Buchwalter (State University of New
York Press, 2015), 98n14.
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1971), he argues contains Hegel’s most rigorously philosophical conception of the state, society,
and political life.11 As a consequence of my exclusive focus on Hegel’s mature writing, I will not
directly address Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of labor (through which he ascribes
world-historical significance to the slave’s labor) or his critics.12 While a treatment of the
consistency of Hegel’s social and political thought throughout his lifetime is beyond the scope of
my thesis, I hope to evince that Hegel provides compelling arguments for his concept of labor
and its ethical implications within his mature political writings.
Today, many of the most influential Anglophone interpretations of Hegel’s mature social
theory have moved away from ascribing a central role to labor in either his theory of subjectformation or the various problems which arise in his theory of civil society. Thus, for many
contemporary influential interpreters of Hegel’s social theory such Frederick Neuhouser, the
ethical significance of the processes of civil society—both their deficiencies and achievements—
are evaluated in terms of which the labor process is largely absent.13 As a result, interpreters like
Neuhouser are subsequently unable to satisfactorily make sense of Hegel’s notion of abstract
labor, which fundamentally characterizes the deplorable conditions of a repetitive, unfulfilling,
and uncultivating factory labor process, or how Hegel could endorse the automation of some

11

Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations Between Dialectics and Economics (MIT
Press, 1977), 449–464 and passim.
12
For just a couple of these criticisms see (most recently) Paul Redding, “The Role of Work within the
Processes of Recognition in Hegel’s Idealism,” in New Philosophies of Labour: Work and the Social
Bond, ed. Nicholas Smith and Jean-Philippe Deranty (Brill, 2012), 41ff and 59f; H. S. Harris, Hegel’s
Ladder (Hackett, 1997), 379n33; Armstrong George Kelly, “Notes on Hegel’s ‘Lordship and Bondage,’”
in The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Jon Stewart (State
University of New York Press, 1998), 172–91; Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Hegel’s Dialectic of SelfConsciousness,” in Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (Yale
University Press, 1976).
13
Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom (Harvard University
Press, 2003). While undiscussed here, both Charles Taylor and Allen Wood also neglect labor in their
interpretation of Hegel’s social theory (Charles Taylor, Hegel [Cambridge University Press, 1977]; Allen
Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought [Cambridge University Press, 1990]).
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jobs, but not others. To make these claims intelligible, I argue, we must take Hegel as
articulating substantial constraints on what kinds of market-determined activity counts as
properly subject-forming. Of those contemporary Anglophone interpreters that do investigate
Hegel’s mature concept of labor on its own terms, most are concerned with the issues of poverty
and the rabble (Pöbel) rather than the labor process itself.14 While the problem of poverty in
Hegel’s theory of civil society is certainly salient in the analysis of abstract labor and machine
automation, any investigation which fails to extend its analysis of poverty and the rabble to
modern labor processes also fails to acknowledge the essential connection between labor and
ethical life and the importance of Hegel’s remarks on mechanistic labor and machine automation.
By considering Hegel’s critique of abstract labor primarily from the perspective of the labor
process itself, my interpretation of this concept challenges those similar to Neuhouser’s, which
understand abstract labor instead as describing the novel kind of social relations produced by
civil society’s requirements of universal exchange and formal equality.
In the following section, I address the context and general argument of the Philosophy of
Right and explain the concept of the free will which stands at its base (Section II). In the third
section, I give an account of Hegel’s concept of labor as it develops out of the sociality of needs
and explain in broad outline why Hegel thinks labor plays a central ethical function in modern
society (Section III). Next, I address Hegel’s complicated notion of abstract labor and its most
common misinterpretations (Section IV). In this section, I also show more specifically how labor

14

The most notable scholar in this camp is Shlomo Avineri, who tackles many of the issues concerning
civil society addressed in this thesis from the perspective of poverty rather than the nature of the labor
process itself (Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State [Cambridge University Press, 1972]).
More recently, Frank Ruda has analyzed the rabble as the irreducible hole within civil society that, as the
sole example of non-sublatable, non-dialectical difference in Hegel’s system, retroactively both
challenges and makes possible the state (Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right [Continuum, 2011]).
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is, for Hegel, necessary for the formation of Bildung and that Hegel’s concept of Bildung is
importantly linked to the ideas of habit and ethical subjectivity or subject-formation. In the fifth
section, I address why abstract labor deadens its undertakers and show that Hegel purposes
machine automation as their remedy, which I argue ought to be read as consistent with his
scientific approach to the state and labor described in sections II, III, and IV (Section V).

8
2

THE CONTEXT AND SCIENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

The stated goal of the Philosophy of Right is to “comprehend and portray the state as
inherently rational entity” which entails “showing how the state, as the ethical universe, should
be recognized” (PR 21). This task is fulfilled by an ever-deepening account of freedom as it
develops through the stages of right (PR §30), which ultimately culminates in the state, “the
spirit which is present in the world” (PR §270R).15 The state is worthy of rational recognition
precisely because it actualizes “substantial freedom,” the fullest, most self-aware expression of
human freedom (PR §257). The modern state’s “strength” comes from its assurance of the
individual’s “complete freedom of particularity” (PR §260A) though its integration of the two
other institutions of modern ethical life: the family and civil society (PR §§260–261). For Hegel,
“civil society”—literally bürgerliche Gesellschaft or bourgeois society—signifies the “system of
atomism” (EM §523) in which the natural immediacy fostered by the family is superseded by the
private and productive “universal egoism”16 of particularized individuals (PR §182A; PR
§289R17).
Within Hegel’s philosophical system outlined in the Encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Right
expands on the Encyclopaedia sections found under the heading “objective spirit,” which itself is
located in the last position of the architectonic sequence: logic, nature, spirit. The full realization
of objective spirit is achieved in what Hegel calls ethical life (Sittlichkeit), which is itself divided

15

The state, for Hegel, is thus the central locus of ethical life and always takes on an ethical significance
beyond that of a prudent political organization; the state describes the total organization of a world: “the
state is the divine will as present spirit, unfolding as the actual shape and organization of a world” (PR
§270R).
16
Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 134.
17
“Civil society is the field of conflict in which the private interest of each individual comes up against
that of everyone else” (PR §289R). Marx rightly suggests reading this passage as Hegel’s “definition of
civil society as the bellum omnium contra omnes” (Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’,
ed. Joseph J O’Malley, trans. Annette Jolin [Cambridge University Press, 1972], 42).
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into three parts: the family (PR §§158–181), civil society (PR §§182–256), and the state (PR
§§257–360).18 The institution of the modern family in marriage, the sharing of familial
resources, and the rearing of children constitutes the immediate and natural existence of ethical
life (PR §157; PR §160). This realm of ethicality is primarily engaged through individuals’ love
and feeling (PR §158), and, in general, casts the “sensuous moment which pertains to natural
life… in its ethical context” (PR §164). Hegel’s sections on the family thus attempt to recuperate
the spontaneous kinship relations found in any human society into a modern theory of ethical
life, giving these at first merely natural kinship relationships an ethical role and value.
We will develop the two other spheres of ethical life more fully throughout our investigation;
however, two points of clarification about the relationship between civil society and the state are
now in order. First, Hegel’s tripartite division of ethical life does not give equal weight and
interconnectedness to each division.19 Rather, civil society is closer to the state than to the family.
In the both the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopaedia, Hegel calls civil society the “external
state” (PR §183; EM §523) and, in the former, acknowledges that civil society is often confused
with the state (PR §258R), a misrecognition unlikely to be made between the family and civil
society despite Hegel’s attempt to characterize civil society as a “universal family” apropos the
corporations (PR §239). Second, we must resist the temptation to map the spheres of civil society
and the state to the spheres of economics and politics as we ordinarily understand these terms.
While this mapping does capture some sense of Hegel’s distinction between civil society and the

18

Ethical life is the full realization of spirit and freedom because it actualizes both subjective and
objective well-being and thus provides genuine reconciliation: “the unity of the subjective with the
objective good which has being in and for itself is ethical life, and the reconciliation which takes place in
it is in accord with the concept” (PR §141A).
19
In typical Hegelian fashion, this gradation of the divisions’ depth and importance is reflected in the
amount of content required for their development. Measured quantitatively: 23 sections (about 20 pages
or 11%) for the family, 74 sections (54 pages or 37%) for civil society, and 103 sections or (105 pages or
52%) for the state.
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state, his insistence that the corporations, the police, and the juridical system all fall within the
realm of civil society, if taken seriously and not as an external forcing of this material into a ridged
and dogmatic schematic, indicates that Hegel views civil society as encompassing aspects of social
life that we would ordinarily consider to be political (hence his description of civil society as the
external state).20 Moreover, Hegel was aware of the ambiguities in the English usage of the term
civil society, which found divergent and often contradictory meanings in the works of Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, and took this ambiguity to indicate the
true dialectical nature of the political-economic relationship. 21 Thus, we ought to understand
Hegel’s state as referring in the first instance not to the political aspects of society in opposition to
the economic ones, but rather to the spiritual-organic unity and logical ground of the sociopolitical
realm itself.22
While the state may be something like the last word on social freedom, the other stages of
right are not to be understood as wrong paths taken along the way. Rather, each prior stage of
right develops a particular aspect of freedom missing from the others. Each “is a distinct variety
of right, because each of them gives determinate shape and existence to freedom” (PR §30R).
The upshot of Hegel’s progressive conception of right is that each stage of right must be
understood as uniquely contributing to the actualization of freedom—including, of course, civil

Cf. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 4f.
For Hegel’s knowledge of the conceptual confusion surrounding the term civil society see Gareth
Stedman Jones, “Hegel and the Economics of Civil Society,” Civil Society: History and Possibilities, 2001,
105–30 and Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 141ff. According to Avineri, Hegel was likely
“reading Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society” during his time in Berlin (Avineri,
Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 141n28).
22
Despite appearing last in the mode of presentation, Hegel understands ethical life, and, in turn, the state,
as the logical foundation of each preceding moment. Thus Hegel writes that “the sphere of right and that
of morality cannot exist independently; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation” (PR
§141A). Frank Ruda has helpfully theorized this process of grounding as Hegel’s logic of retroaction, cf.
Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 105f and Frank Ruda, “Hegel’s First Words,” in The Dash―The Other Side
of Absolute Knowing (MIT Press, 2018), 87–105.
20
21
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society. Understood as rational, the social practices of civil society must not exist merely as
necessary evils to be contained and remediated by the state, but must instead somehow positively
contribute to human freedom. Therefore, Hegel must explain how any practice identified as a
necessary element of civil society (such as labor) contributes to the actualization of freedom, or,
at the very least, he must make intelligible the sacrifices that such an element demands as a part
of an organic whole. In short, Hegel is faced with the task of reconciliation: he must demonstrate
how each aspect of civil society substantiates and preserves our “subjective freedom” within the
modern state (PR 22).
This process of actualizing social freedom begins with the concept of the free will (PR §4).
Each stage of right is, taken formally, the embodiment of a new kind of will (PR §§5–7; EM
§487), and each obtains its “external material” from both the natural realm, including within it
human biology, and the sociosymbolic realm of human social relations (EM §483). The free will
which emerges from this process of actualization both obtains objectivity—my freedom is no
longer my arbitrary caprice but is instead the result of my conscious interaction with nature and
others—and is raised to the world of spirit, a process which Hegel characterizes as translation:
“the activity of the will consists in sublating the contradiction between subjectivity and
objectivity and in translating its end from their subjective determination into an objective one,
while at the same time remaining with itself in this objectivity” (PR §28, cf. PR §§8–9). This
means that the “absolute drive” of the free will is to realize itself within objective social
existence, which requires that it sublate the realm of “negative freedom” or “the freedom of the

12
understanding” and enter realm of substantial freedom mediated through rational thought. This
unity of the free will and its existence Hegel calls the idea of right (PR §29).23
The Philosophy of Right is Hegel’s sustained investigation of this idea of right as the unity of
concept of right and its realization (PR §30). The investigation is a science because it is an
immanent development of this idea such that no external logical or empirical content need be
imported to articulate its rational organization; it employs a method in which “its progress does
not depend on the assertion that various circumstances are present or on the subsequent
application of the universal to such material of extraneous origin” (PR §31).24 Hegel’s scientific
method thus places his political thought between the two poles of positivistic empiricism and
rational formalism.25 Contra empiricism, the presence of contingent circumstances (this or that
kind of state, political constitution, election result, etc.) cannot be the ultimate arbitrator of what
counts as the actualization of right. Thus, unlike the contemporary understanding of science as
the realm of thought concerned precisely with the empirical investigation of natural and social
states of affairs, for Hegel the significance of science is garnered only when thought severs its
unequivocal dependency on contingent circumstances, which does not, of course, amount to a
denial of contingency tout court. Contra formalism, however, the philosophical project of the
Philosophy of Right cannot be understood as an ex ante application of logic for the construction

23

For a full account of what Hegel takes to be the insufficiency (yet necessary presupposition) of the
concept of the free will for the development of a complete account of objective spirit, see Allen Wood,
Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 58–73 and David James, “Practical
Necessity and the ‘Logic’ of Civil Society,” in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right: A Critical
Guide, ed. David James (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 179–184.
24
Cf. Hegel’s discussion of science’s “absolute method” in the 1812 and 1831 prefaces to the Science of
Logic, esp. pp. 9–12 and his similar methodological reflections in the final section on absolute idea, pp.
736–753 (Georg Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George di Giovanni [Cambridge University Press,
2010]).
25
For an account of why this opposition of empiricism and formalism is, in the context of Hegel’s
absolute spirit, a false dichotomy, see Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda, The Dash, 11–28.
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of the necessary and sufficient conditions of a just or ethical society à la Plato, a task which
amounts to nothing more than the thoughtless subsumption of a given content under an abstract
universal.26 Rather, as Hegel famously writes in the introduction to the Science of Logic, the task
of philosophy-as-science is “simply to take up, what is there before us”27 or, equivalently, “to
comprehend what is” (PR 21). For a scientific analysis of society Hegel need only take up what
is before him because “it can only be the nature of the content which is responsible for movement
in scientific knowledge, for it is the content’s own reflection that first posits and generates what
that content is.”28 The social world, in other words, generates its own rational content or
undertakes its own autoanaylsis, and any divergence from this methodological principle can only
introduce heteronomy and externality into its philosophical deduction. Each aspect of true
sociality returns to its rational kernel as its own result: the “series of concepts” (the categories of
the Philosophy of Right) and the “series of shapes” (the empirical content of the ethical state) are
ultimately “one and the same thing (PR §32).
As an implication of its status as a science, Hegel’s social theory is deeply historicist as well
as historical such that the theory itself as well as our comprehension of it cannot be separated
from the concrete conditions of its actuality.29 Consistent with his thoroughgoing critique of
empty oughts—whatever philosophy is, it certainly does not involve “issuing instructions on
how the world ought to be” (PR 23)—Hegel’s account of labor and civil society is not intended
to be a series of commandments from on high; rather, it takes the rationality and actuality of the

Hegel condemns Plato’s Republic as an “empty ideal” (PR 20f) and a suppression of the principle of
subjectivity (PR §262A).
27
Hegel, The Science of Logic, 47/21.55.
28
Ibid., 9f/21.7f.
29
For Hegel’s inversion of Kant’s abstract and necessary conditions of possibility, see Rocío Zambrana,
Hegel’s Theory of Intelligibility (The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 74.
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present as its point of departure (PR 20).30 Thus, in light of Hegel’s dialectical method, the
Philosophy of Right must be read as simultaneously directing its gaze solely upon sociopolitical
reality, never beyond or above it, while also discerning within this reality a logic or rationality of
which this reality would be its symptom, appearance, or expression—and all of this without
reducing the real to a mere determination of the universal logos alone (as this would eliminate
the principle of subjectivity so central to Hegel’s theory of modernity [PR §316A; PR §317A]).
Thus, Hegel’s own historical milieu, and especially the economic and political realities of his
early nineteenth-century Germany, are essential constituents of (yet nonidentical and
nonisomorphic with) his political thought. And while a proper addressing of these historical
conditions would take us beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to bear in mind that
machine automation was more or less non-existent in Germany during the period in which Hegel
wrote the Philosophy of Right. Thus, Hegel likely arrived at the idea from both a logical
following out of the tendencies of already-existing industrial production and from second-hand
accounts of English political economists.31 The significance of these methodological and
historical observations will be seen when we consider the success of Hegel’s solutions to the
problems of civil society.

It is for this reason why the label ‘social theory’ is more apt than ‘political philosophy’ for describing
Hegel’s project. If political philosophy today is concerned primarily with what is known as ideal theory
or, as Isaiah Berlin writes of his Oxford mentor Douglas Cole’s view, that today we accept that “political
theory is a branch of moral philosophy, which starts from the discovery, or application, of moral notions
in the sphere of political relations,” then the Philosophy of Right is in many ways un-, or even anti-,
philosophical (Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on
Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy [Oxford University Press, 2002], 168).
31
See Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel, 367: “[Hegel’s political philosophy’s] essential features reflect
less the contemporary state of Germany than the social and economic problems that arose on a European
scale in the wake of the French revolution and the Industrial Revolution in England.”
30
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3

HEGEL’S CONCEPTS OF LABOR AND ABSTRACTION IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT
The concept of “labor” or “work” (Arbeit)32 plays various roles throughout Hegel’s

philosophy. We can sort these roles into approximately three categories: the activity or general
form of labor (developed primarily in the Phenomenology’s master-slave dialectic), the
objectivity and sociality of labor in modern economic life (developed primarily in the Philosophy
of Right), and the conceptuality of labor or labor in thought—the labor of the negative, the labor
of the concept, the labor of spirit, and so on (developed primarily in the various introductory
material of the Phenomenology, the Logic, and the Encyclopedia).33 While there is some sense of
unity between these three meanings of labor in Hegel’s writings, in accordance with my focus on
Hegel’s mature social theory I limit my analysis to Hegel’s treatment of the second, more
directly economic type of labor in the Philosophy of Right and Encyclopedia.
Hegel’s account of civil society is divided into three parts: “The System of Needs” (PR
§§189–208), “The Administration of Justice” (PR §§209–229), and “The Police and the
Corporation” (PR §§230–256). His account of economic labor is primarily laid out in the first of
these three divisions, in three paragraphs grouped under the subheading “The Nature of Work”
(PR §§196–198). Broadly speaking, in these three paragraphs Hegel gives labor a central role

Throughout this thesis, I use the English word “labor” to refer to the German noun “die Arbeit.”
Nisbet’s translation of the Philosophy of Right uses both “work” and “labour” to translate Arbeit.
Quotations using “work” or “labour” always refer to Arbeit.
33
We could also add a fourth kind of labor found in Hegel’s philosophy of religion concerned with the
Protestant question of justification by works. However, in these contexts, Hegel, following Martin Luther,
often uses the noun Werke instead of Arbeiten (e.g., “des Gesetzes Werke” in Luther’s translation of
Romans). For a brief account of Luther’s influence on Hegel regarding the ethical necessity of laboring in
civil society see Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, pp. 6–9. For a longer treatment that also touches more
generally on Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, see Joachim Ritter “Hegel and the Reformation,” in Hegel and
the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (MIT Press,
1984).
32
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within civil society, characterizing it as “process of formation” which gives “means their value”
and the “mediation” of these means by needs (PR §196). Labor is, in other words, the medium
through which need and satisfaction become socially intertwined, as is evinced in Hegel’s
definition of the system of needs as “the mediation of need and the satisfaction of the individual
through his work and through the work and satisfaction of the needs of all the others” (PR §188).
Moreover, Hegel’s ethical conception of labor relies on its formation not only of the “material
which is immediately provided by nature” but also of the subjectivity and needs of the worker. It
is this characterization of labor as formative of both the product of labor and the laborer herself
that constitutes labor’s fundamental determination for Hegel; and it is both product and worker,
subject and object, individual subjectivity and external nature that give and receive from through
labor.34 The achievement of rational human subjectivity through labor is a dialectical workingthrough of both sides of this relation, a “process of self-production both by going out of himself
and by educating himself inwardly” (PR §10A). This reciprocal formation of subject and object
permeates each of labor’s three guises outline above, but is particularly central in Hegel’s theory
of modern civil society and its influence on the process of ethical subject-formation.
In addition to reciprocally mediating subjectivity and sociality through the generation and
satisfaction of need, modern labor processes also impute on both of these extremes a certain form
of universality that Hegel calls abstract. This tendency towards abstraction manifests repeatedly
in Hegel’s theorization of social need, reoccurring in PR §§190–192 and EM §525. In these
sections, Hegel argues that abstraction infects not only the “quality of both needs and means” but
also “the mutual relations between individuals” (PR §192) and, of course, the labor process itself

Hegel’s distinction between labor’s two kinds of formation—educational versus productive—is
described in Anders Bartonek, “Labour Against Capitalism?,” 115 and Michael Hardt, “The Withering of
Civil Society,” Social Text, no. 45 (1995), 28f.
34
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(PR §198). As the division of labor and economic interdependence become ubiquitous within
civil society, social needs, labor processes, and subjective attitudes towards others all become
colored by abstraction, leading individuals to develop a “habit of abstraction in enjoyment,
information, knowledge, and behavior” (EM §525).
However, despite the proliferation of abstraction in his account of the various features of
modern needs-satisfaction, pinning down the precise meaning of abstraction in this context is
difficult. Unlike other of Hegel’s central metaphysical categories, abstraction and its contrast
term, concertation or the concrete, never receive a direct treatment in the either of the two logics.
Yet, the words abstract and concrete proliferate throughout all of Hegel’s writings. This situation
has led one interpreter to conclude that the intelligibility of Hegel’s concept of abstraction is
even more dependent upon grasping the totality of the logic than the other standard-issue
categories that fill its table of contents.35 Nonetheless, while abstraction is usually charged with a
negative valiance for Hegel (and a positive one for concretion)—take the narrowness of abstract
right,36 the one-sidedness of the abstract determinations of the understanding (PR §1R; PR
§10R), or the notorious abstract universal, for just a couple of examples—Hegel clearly

“Hegel's doctrine of abstraction is not finally intelligible apart from the details of his most
distinctive conception, the Concept, the explication of which is, in a sense, the whole burden of
the Logic” (Philip Grier, “Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic,” in Essays on Hegel’s Logic, ed.
35

George di Giovanni (State University of New York Press, 1990), 59–76). Grier intends this point to be
non-trivial, as he thinks many of the other Hegelian categories can be understood, at least in their most
important significations, outside of the totality of the logic. Cf. also Errol Harris’ response in which he
argues that abstract/concrete are not categories and can thus be appropriately applied in equal degree to
every stage of the dialectic or category of the logic (Errol Harris, “A Reply to Philip Grier,” in Essays on
Hegel’s Logic, 77–84).
36
Thus, Frank Ruda correctly writes that the “abstractness” in abstract right “refers to the fact that
personality as fundament of right is gained by abstracting from all determinations which define an
individual in a state” (Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 199n9).
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understands processes of abstraction to be a constitutive part of social freedom.37 The term’s
fundamental ambiguity, both in its metaphysical and its ethical-political senses, has not failed in
leading astray many interpreters of Hegel’s concept of abstract labor, two of which we will
address later. Before that, however, I will outline briefly what I take to be the most salient
aspects of abstraction within the context of the Philosophy of Right, with an emphasis on its
significance for Hegel’s understanding of the modern labor process.
In his account of concept of the will in the introduction of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel
characterizes abstraction as the will’s ability to strip away any specific content or determinacy
from one’s self-conception or, in other words, the will’s capacity to eliminate any external
relations it has to the world, other wills, objects, and so on—an ability which constitutes the
will’s moment of pure indeterminacy.38 The deeper meaning of this seemingly arbitrary capacity
of abstraction held by self-consciousness is, for Hegel, that such a stripping-away necessitates a
decontextualization from the constitutive elements of self-consciousness; that is, to conceive of a
thing abstractly or to conceive of a thing in isolation from its relations to others is to conceive of
the thing as not the thing that it really is. It is for this reason, as Hegel repeatedly points out, that
complete abstraction is, strictly speaking, impossible, as any abstraction from all determinations
is always itself an act of determining, namely a determining as abstract. As a result, the will’s
capacity for abstraction “is not true infinity or the concrete universality of the concept, but only
something determinate and one-sided” since “abstract[ing] from all determinacy, it is itself not
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Hegel sees this tendency towards abstraction as an underlying feature of modern society and modern
subjectivity more generally. See for example the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirt, trans. A. V.
Miller (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 9.
38
In his 1824–25 lectures on the Philosophy of Right, Hegel gestures more explicitly towards the ethical
implications of the will’s capacity for abstraction: “The human being can abstract from every content,
make himself free of it, whatever is in my representation I can let go, I can make myself entirely empty…
the human being has the self-consciousness of being able to take up any content, or of letting it go, he can
let go of all bonds of friendship, love, whatever they may be (VPR IV 111f)”
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without determinacy; and the fact that it is abstract and one-sided constitutes its determinacy,
deficiency, and finitude” (PR §6A). In other words, in abstracting from any given content or
from all determinacy, the will fails to achieve what it sets out to do—viz., realize itself as a
genuine universal—and so its striving for “pure indeterminacy” (PR §5) turns out to be just
another kind of determinacy.
Shifting our focus back to abstraction in the context of civil society, it is for this reason that
we cannot say that modern civil society’s needs, labor processes, and social relations—all
characterized by abstraction—are indeterminate and ethically neutral. While such needs, labor,
and social relations are formally free (in the sense that their determining is the result of legally
unrestricted subjective arbitrariness39), they are nonetheless determined by this formal freedom
as the products of subjective caprice (and thus are not necessarily in accordance with the
demands of self-conscious ethicality). Hegel argues that this formal freedom is deficient in part
because it is the product of conceptual distinction-making and social differentiation undertaken
without concern for whether these abstractions actually realize the freedom of all members of
society, and, as such, are one-sided activities characteristic of the cognitive faculty of the
understanding (EM §525).40 In this sense, Hegel’s notion of abstract social need may be mapped
onto the standard concept of utility central to economic thinking at least since Samuel von
Pufendorf (1632–1694), generally defined as “the capacity of a good or service to satisfy a want,

In civil society, “the ultimate and essential determinant is subjective opinion and the particular arbitrary
will” (PR §206). On this point, see Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch, “Why Ethical Life is Fragile:
Rights, Markets and States in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in Elements of the Philosophy of Right: A
Critical Guide, ed. David James, 142.
39

“The intellect draws distinctions among needs and thereby multiplies indefinitely both the
needs themselves and the means for these different needs, making the needs and the means ever
more abstract.”
40
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of whatever kind.”41 However, for Hegel, the notion of abstraction extends beyond the confines
of descriptive theorizing of decision-making under scarcity and comes to characterize “formal
culture in general” or the entire sphere of civil society, both the subjectivities of its members and
the objective forms of labor, need, and social relations (EM §525). In these spheres, the tendency
towards abstraction is a movement towards formal universality, in the sense that each of these
spheres begins to orient itself around exchange and need in general rather than concrete need, on
the one hand, and their processes of realization become mechanistic and narrowly specialized, on
the other. For example, Hegel argues that, under the sway of abstraction, the generation of social
needs becomes determined primarily by the principle of profit as opposed to the concrete desires
of individuals (PR §191A); relations between individuals become formally identical as persons
are treated as universal consumers, not as members of a particular gender, class, race, nationality,
etc. (PR §209A); these social relations become mediated by the universal means exchange,
money (PR §204); and each labor process becomes oriented around the specialized massproduction of a single commodity against the background of wide-reaching markets of exchange
(PR §192).
While the specifically modern innovation of abstraction is a constitutive moment of
actualized social freedom, Hegel is quick to ethically problematize what he takes to be the
widespread yet unjustifiable elevation of this moment of freedom above all others. As we have
seen, Hegel associates the subjective attitude which unduly privileges the will’s capacity for
abstraction with the undialectical Verstand or faculty of the understanding (as opposed to
Vernunft or reason). In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel even connects this attitude with the

R. D. Collison Black, “Utility,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, eds. Lawrence E.
Blume and Steven N. Durlauf (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
41
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subjective disposition of the rabble.42 While this first mode of entangling the processes of
abstraction with the understanding is to be expected—Hegel correlates these two in nearly all of
his writings—the second is more surprising. The rabble, the abjected and indignant poor
unintegratable into ethical life, are characterized precisely by their lack of education and
rebelliousness towards government and society writ large. That the rabble is simultaneously for
Hegel a paradigm of an essential, albeit deficient, moment in the process of cognition and social
freedom in general is puzzling. However, we can make some sense of Hegel’s entanglement of
the rabble with the understanding’s abstraction by noting that, for Hegel, an over-emphasis on
abstraction in theory has implications for the development of ethical subjectivity in practice. In
fetishizing the theoretical moment of the “negative understanding” (PR §272), the rabble
become ethically deficient by developing an unconditional distrust of the state and its
bureaucrats. This is because by privileging abstraction in their conception of right, the rabble
“take the negative as a starting-point” and thus view “malevolence and distrust of malevolence”
as the fundamental motors of political-institutional organization. In characterizing the rabble in
this way, Hegel connects abstraction with disparate aspects of his social theory: the constitution
of the will (the moment of the will’s negativity), the activity of thought (the faculty of
understanding), and a deficiency in one’s ethical disposition (the rabble’s distrust), in addition to
the descriptive transformations in labor, need, and social relations produced by the ascendancy of
abstraction within the system of needs, thus demonstrating the wide and multifarious roles

“To take the negative as a starting-point and to make malevolence and distrust of malevolence the
primary factor… is, as far as thought it concerned, characteristic of the negative understanding and, as far
as the disposition is concerned, characteristic of the outlook of the rabble” (PR §272); “it characteristic of
the rabble, and of the negative viewpoint in general, to assume ill will, or less than good will, on the part
of the government” (PR §301). For the topic of the rabble’s relationship to the understanding and
abstraction see Matt S. Whitt, “The problem of Poverty and the Limits of Freedom in Hegel’s Theory of
the Ethical State,” Political Theory 41, no. 2 (2013), 280.
42
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abstraction plays in his mature social theory.43 As Michael Hardt writes, Hegel’s civil society is
in the first instance not the organization of labor as such, but the “organization of abstract
labor.”44 It is to this notion that we now turn.

For a critical discussion of Hegel’s association of the rabble with the negative understanding, see Frank
Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 115ff. Ruda argues that Hegel cannot make this association, as the negative
understanding’s abstraction from all determination is always an arbitrary subjective decision whereas the
making of the rabble is a necessary development of civil society, independent of any subjective caprice.
44
Michael Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” Social Text 45 (1995), 29.
43
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4

WHO LABORS ABSTRACTLY? ABSTRACT LABOR, HABIT, AND BILDUNG IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
Now that we have laid out a few of the many meanings of abstraction at play in Hegel’s

conceptualization of civil society, we may turn to the central focus of the remainder of my
argument: Hegel’s concept of abstract labor (abstrakte Arbeit). Given my focus, I quote its
section in full in both the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopedia:
The universal and objective aspect of work consists, however, in that process of
abstraction which confers a specific character on means and needs and hence also
on production, so giving rise to the division of labour. Through this division, the
work of the individual becomes simpler, so that his skill at his abstract work
becomes greater, as does the volume of his output. At the same time, this
abstraction of skill and means makes the dependence and reciprocity of human
beings in the satisfaction of their other needs complete and entirely necessary.
Furthermore, the abstraction of production makes work increasingly mechanical,
so that the human being is eventually able to step aside and let a machine take his
place. (PR §198)
Labour too thus becomes more abstract, and leads on the one hand by its
uniformity to ease of labour and to increased production, on the other hand to
restriction to one skill, and thus to a more unconditional dependence on the social
system. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanical, and develops to the point
where the machine can take the place of human labour. (EM §526)
Summarizing briefly, abstract labor is the structure of labor typical of modern modes of
needs-satisfaction; it describes, for Hegel, the “universal and objective” aspect of modern labor
processes, characterized in effect by a sophisticated division of labor, wide-scale
interdependency, and an increasing mechanization of, and use of machines in, the labor process.
By abstract labor, Hegel means something more than just the social division of labor or the
particularization and specialization required for success and competitive productivity in the

24
marketplace, a kind of labor we may henceforth call divided labor.45 Divided forms of labor are a
subset of abstract labor; they engender a highly adaptive labor process in which each element
tends towards its full discretization and independence, separating both the raw material and the
laborer from the unified final product. Divided labor thus stands in contrast to many other kinds
of labor such as the artisan’s craftsmanship, the peasant’s agricultural labor, and even the state
bureaucrat’s intellectual labor. However, the notion of divided labor does not capture the subjectforming aspects of abstract labor that Hegel wishes to highlight.
Given Hegel’s emphasis on the ethical role of labor as subject-forming over its more overtly
economical functions, it is no surprise that it is the deadening effects of abstract labor that most
concern him.46 This priority of subject-formation in Hegel’s problematization of modern labor is
evident in his distinction between mere poverty and the dehumanized rabble: “Poverty in itself
does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with
poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc.” (PR §244A,
emphasis mine).47 In the case of the rabble, the heart of the problem lies in the specific kind of
subjectivity produced by their position within the social structure. It is for this reason that Hegel
is required to equally problematize a luxurious rich rabble in addition to an indignant poor one.48
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I owe this distinction between merely divided and fully abstract labor to discussions with Sebastian
Rand. Neuhouser makes much the same distinction when he gestures towards abstract labor as that
“feature unique to civil society” which is “responsible for its having a formative function beyond those
that follow merely from the general requirement, implicit in any social division of labor, namely, that
labor be socially productive” (Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 162).
46
This interpretation of Hegel’s concerns over abstract labor is aligned with those given by Waszek, “The
Division of Labor,” 71f, Bartonek, “Labour Against Capitalism?,” 115ff, and Cesarale, “Hegel’s Notion
of Abstract Labor,” 93ff.

The centrality of labor’s role in forming subjectivity is likewise evident in Hegel’s theory of
the estates, discussed below.
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For a discussion of the distinction and necessary intertwining of these two forms of rabble see Frank
Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, chapters 4–6.
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In his expansive study of the Scottish Enlightenment’s influence on Hegel’s social theory,
Norbert Waszek expands on this tension between abstract labor’s potential for subjective
forming and deforming, on the one hand, and the efficiencies gained through divided labor, on
the other, arguing that Hegel views abstract labor as a “two-edged weapon.”49 This is because, on
the one hand, the spread of abstract labor in society brings many benefits to its members, in
terms of both their material well-being and their intersubjective freedom. The division of labor,
conceived by Hegel as a consequence of abstract labor, simplifies the tasks of labor and thereby
increases the skill of each laborer at their limited task, and thus ultimately increases the overall
productive output.50 Moreover, economic-productive interdependency becomes “complete and
entirely necessary” (PR §198), solidifying the grounds of mutual recognition in civil society.
Finally, by simplifying labor tasks and demanding continual increases in productivity, abstract
labor also furnishes the possibility that deadening living labor may be replaced by machines in
the future.
On the other hand, however, abstract labor poses several ethical and political issues for the
realization of social freedom. In particular, Hegel identifies three fundamental and wide-reaching
social problems associated with the prevalence of abstract labor, all of which reappear
throughout Hegel’s political writings: (1) “short-term economic disruptions” resulting in
unemployment and poverty (2) social inequality, and (3) the deadening (Abstumpfung) of the

Norbert Waszek, “The Division of Labor: From the Scottish Enlightenment to Hegel,” The Owl of
Minerva 15, no. 1 (1983), 72. See also Norbert Waszek, The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account
of ‘Civil Society’ (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), esp. chaps. 4 and 6. Avineri makes much the
same point when characterizing “Hegel’s ambiguous attitude to civil society,” writing that “on one hand,
[civil society] is the major achievement of the modern world; on the other, woe to that society of men that
allows the forces of civil society to rule unimpeded” (Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 240).
50
“Through this division, the work of the individual becomes simpler, so that his skill at his abstract work
becomes greater, as does the volume of his output” (PR §198); abstract labor “leads on the one hand… to
ease of labour and to increased production, on the other hand to restriction in one skill” (EM §526).
49
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worker’s subjectivity as well as that of her community.51 Importantly, Hegel understands these
problems to be structural, systematic, and necessary results of the modern labor process.
Following the English economists whom he read, Hegel knew that such problems ought not to be
“seen as a mere slip in the execution of an otherwise flawless scheme, but as a necessary result”
whereby “the disadvantages are most intensely felt ‘where the division of labour is brought to
perfection’.”52 Taken together, these issues demonstrate that Hegel was aware of many of the
problems immanent to the nascent civil society emerging in the Western Europe at the beginning
of the acutely nineteenth century.53 Only the issue of Abstumpfung, however, reflects the internal
conditions of the changing labor process wrought by abstraction, so we will limit our analysis to
it.
4.1

Misunderstandings of Abstract Labor
Hegel’s concept of abstract labor leads itself to a host of misunderstandings, not only

because of its multitudinous role throughout his writings but equally because of the influence of
Karl Marx on interpretations of Hegel’s social and political thought. Perhaps the most common
line of misinterpretation of Hegel’s notion of abstract labor is the Marxist one, which attempts to
find one of Marx’s concepts in Hegel’s. However, Marx’s notions of abstract labor, complex
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Ibid., 72. According to Waszek, Hegel maintained the primacy of these three problems throughout all
of his political writing, from the “Jena manuscripts to his last Berlin lectures.” (Waszek, “The Division of
Labor,” 56). Shlomo Avineri also affirms the continuity of Hegel’s concern in his political writings for
the social ills produced by the expanding scope and centrality of abstract labor in modern life (Hegel’s
Theory of the Modern State, 98f).
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Waszek, “The Division of Labor,” 57, quoting Adam Smith, The Glasgow Edition of the Works and
Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. V, 539. As Karl Marx would later put a similar point, “it is
inevitable that many people not of a criminal disposition are cut off from the green tree of morality” (Karl
Marx, Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood, quoted in Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 81).
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Avineri correctly reiterates Waszek’s conclusion, writing that “Hegel emerges… as a philosopher
acutely conscious of the achievements and the limitations of the modern age” and whose social theory
contains “one of the most acute insights into the working of modern, industrial society” (Hegel’s Theory
of the Modern State, ix, cf. 94).
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labor, and alienated labor—the three most commonly misapplied—are decidedly not Hegel’s
despite the latter’s influence on their development.
For Marx, abstract labor refers to the labor process conceived from the perspective of its
production of exchange-value as opposed to its production of use-value. Thus, Marx writes that
abstract labor is “the general character as expenditure of human labor-power in the abstract”54 or
the “common quality of being human labour in general.”55 Abstract labor is, in Marx’s sense, the
common element that unifies all the different kinds of particularized concrete labor. Thus, while
Marx and Hegel agree that abstract labor is characteristic of the capitalist mode of production
insofar as it orients labor around the production of exchange-value, Hegel’s abstract labor differs
from Marx’s for two principle reasons. First, Hegel’s concept of abstract labor cannot be
separated from the formation of ethical subjectivity, understood as encompassing the needs and
social relations of individuals. Abstract labor both constitutes and challenges these aspects of
subject-formation through its influence on the laborer’s Bildung. Second, Hegel’s concept of
abstract labor refers to a particular kind of production process—modern industrial manufacturing
and, the trade labor of the petite bourgeoisie, and all else that belongs to the “estate of trade and
industry”—and not simply the quality of being labor in general, modern or otherwise, as in Marx
(PR §204).
Related to Marx’s concept of abstract labor is the infamous ‘reduction problem’ found at the
beginning of Capital: the operation of reducing, for the purpose of analysis, all complex labor to
its social average or to the amount of socially necessary simple labor.56 This, too, however, is not
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Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (Penguin Classics,
1992), 308.
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Ibid., 142. See also Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans.
Martin Nicolaus (Penguin Classics, 1993), 296f.
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Ibid., 135.
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Hegel’s concept of abstract labor. As Hegel’s discussions of political economy demonstrate, he
certainly agrees with Marx that abstract labor is open to analysis (especially the discovery of
universal laws working behind the backs of its undertakers) in a way unprecedented by previous
organizations of labor and social need (PR §189R; PR §189A). However, this view of abstract
labor fails to recognize that, for Hegel, not all labor in civil society is abstract in the social and
ethical sense that he is concerned with; for Hegel, there exists labor which is not abstract labor,
not so for Marx. The concrete labor of the peasantry and other agricultural laborers represented
by Hegel’s “substantial or immediate estate,” despite holding an important role in civil society
and being subject to discoverable economic laws and even to capitalistic industrial practices,
opposes the abstract labor processes of the second “formal estate” that Hegel sees as more
essential to modern civil society (PR §201). Thus, in his theory of the estates Hegel carves out a
sphere of modern civil society that, while not appearing as this sphere’s distinguishing mark, is
nonetheless uncolored by abstract labor as far as the ethicality of its way of living is concerned:
In our times, the [agricultural] economy, too, is run in a reflective manner, like a
factory, and it accordingly takes on a character like that of the second estate and
opposed to its own character of naturalness. Nevertheless, this first estate will
always retain the patriarchal way of life and the substantial disposition associated
with it. The human being reacts here with immediate feeling as he accepts what
he receives; he thanks God for it and lives in faith and confidence that this
goodness will continue. What he receives is enough for him; he uses it up, for it
will be replenished. This is a simple disposition which is not concerned with the
acquisition of wealth; it may also be described as that of the old nobility, which
consumed whatever it had. In this estate, the main part is played by nature, and
human industry is subordinate to it. In the second estate, however, it is the
understanding itself which is essential, and the products of nature can be regarded
only as raw materials. (PR §203A)
Since through the estates labor becomes correlated with a way of living and a particular
subjective disposition (i.e., a certain kind of education and habit)—or rather, that the estates are
the rational organization of these subjective phenomena emerging from the different kinds of
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labor—the differences in disposition found among members of the three estates ultimately
represent the ethical and educational differences among the three corresponding labor processes.
Thus, for Hegel, the very existence of the agricultural and universal estates indicates that abstract
labor is just one out of many ways of laboring in the ethical and educative sense, despite Hegel’s
admittance that at least the former sphere “takes on a character like that of the second estate” and
thus begins to incorporate aspects of abstract labor in a descriptive sense. It is for this reason why
Hegel’s concept of abstract labor can neither be the commonality in which all forms of labor
participate in (i.e., Marx’s concept of abstract labor oriented around the production of surplusvalue in the capitalist mode of production) or the analytic prerogative to qualitatively reduce all
labor to some quantity of a unified and simple labor process (i.e., Marx’s reduction to simple
socially necessary labor).
Finally, Hegel’s forthright depiction of the negative ethical consequences of abstract labor
(its dire working conditions, its inevitable poverty and social inequality, its separation of the
laborer from the final product, its deadening of the laborer’s subjectivity and physical wellbeing, and so on) has led some interpreters to read his concept of abstract labor as a prototype of
the young Marx’s concept of alienated labor.57 While this interpretation has the benefit of
correctly conceiving of Hegel’s concept of abstract labor as referring to a specific kind of labor
process and its normative consequences, it fails to recognize that the ethical problems Hegel
associates with abstract labor are decidedly not those of alienation critique. In a modernity in
which “self-consciousness [has become] infinitely reflected into itself,” alienation, understood by
Hegel as self-externalization, is constitutive of ethical subjectivity as opposed to the source of its
deficiency. Quite simply and as our discussion of social need has made clear, for the mature
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Hegel of the Philosophy of Right there simply is no authentic subject from which the laboring
subject could be estranged from. The ‘mineness’ of all social need and desire, even that of the
most sinister origin (e.g., profitability for the few), excludes the possibility of ever discovering a
true desire lying beneath the surface of social appearance as Marx’s alienation critique demands.
Moreover, while we have not discussed the meaning of labor as spiritual activity as developed in
the Phenomenology of Spirt, it is worth noting that labor’s significance at that level is precisely
that of a spiritual self-externalization and alienation that is constitutive of Bildung and subjective
freedom. Following Avineri, we can say that while for Marx the split between economic and
political aspects of subjectivity produced by modern industrial labor is “the measure of the
laborer’s alienation in modern society,” for Hegel this alienation “is the basis of his integration
into it.”58 Abstract labor for Hegel cannot be a means of Marxian alienation critique, as his view
of modern human subjectivity excludes even the possibility of an unalienated subjectivity, a
presupposition upon which Marx’s alienation critique depends.59
Outside of a narrowly Marxist framework, another common misinterpretation of abstract
labor takes it as a synonym for what is today called intellectual labor, immaterial labor, or
cultural labor.60 It should be clear, however, that this too cannot be Hegel’s concept of abstract
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labor. For one, the very possibility of machine automation demonstrates that abstract labor
cannot be another name for intellectual labor, since the latter is by its very nature the kind of
labor that resists automation so far as its genesis is concerned.61 Second, Hegel explicitly
contrasts the labor of the culturally educated and intellectual class, i.e., the universal labor of the
third estate, from the abstract labor of the second estate of trade and industry. Finally, while
certain kinds of immaterial labor have their place in civil society such as trade and the exchange
of commodities in the estate of commerce, Hegel sees abstract labor as being chiefly constituted
by mass manufacturing and craftsmanship (PR §204). It could only be anachronistic to equate
Hegel’s concept of abstract labor with that of immaterial labor which predominates in our
contemporary economies.
The final misunderstanding of abstract labor that we will consider is that of Frederick
Neuhouser.62 Neuhouser argues that we ought to interpret Hegel’s concept of abstract labor as
primarily referring to the specific social relations that laborers have with each other in modern
civil society.63 Furthermore, Neuhouser correctly argues that the social relations of production
are abstract because they are determined from in principle by the exchange of goods and money
in the marketplace; abstract labor is undertaken for the satisfaction of the abstract social needs of
others or need in general as opposed to, say, my own immediate purposes or the commodity’s
use-value. Thus, in summarizing his view on abstract labor, Neuhouser writes that “the point
here is not simply that the fruits of one’s labor can in fact be exchanged for the products of
others but rather that production is carried out with, and determined from the very beginning by,

See PR §68 for Hegel’s brief discussion of “intellectual production” in the context of abstract right.
Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 155–165.
63
Neuhouser writes that abstract labor’s “formative function” and most ethically salient feature “resides
in a certain way the members of civil society relate to one another, or take each others’ wills into
account… that the relations individuals have to one another in civil society are abstract” (ibid., 161f).
61
62

32
the conscious intention to do so.”64 In other words, labor is abstract when it is undertaken
primarily for the purposes of exchange (i.e., undertaken for the production of surplus-value
instead of use-value).
By understanding abstract labor as describing a particular set of social relations in which
members see each other exclusively in terms of their abilities as need-satisfiers instead of
understanding it as describing industrial labor processes, Neuhouser naturally finds nothing
ethically objectionable about abstract labor. That labor is oriented in the first instance towards
the valorization of commodity-objects and the satisfaction of market-mediated needs does not
raise any ethical issues, such as the deadening of the laborer, on its own. However, it is precisely
its neutrality which proves that the view cannot be Hegel’s. First, while Hegel’s use of the term
“abstract” indeed intends to capture the structural influence of exchange on the labor process and
consequently on the Bildung of the laborers, it cannot be reduced to or even summarized by this
meaning. The issues arising from abstract labor of concern to Hegel are not merely the result of
wide-scale exchange. Hegel understands abstract labor as instead essentially involving a
machine-like work process undertaken in atomistic isolation from any kind of intelligible or
rational end. The individualistic ends realized within the marketplace are only “abstractly”
universal (PR §208) and without “actual universality” (PR §207A) in part because they lack a
rational teleology. And, as we have seen, these abstract ends and social needs around which
production is oriented primarily serve to reproduce these very conditions of exchange and to
benefit the few who are to profit the most. Abstract labor therefore threatens the Bildung of its
undertaker both insofar as it forces the laborer to take up physically and spiritually damaging
processes and insofar as it excludes the possibility of achieving one’s genuinely universal ends,
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two threats to the laborer’s Bildung to which Neuhouser’s view of abstract labor is blind.
Second, Neuhouser’s interpretation is ultimately inconsistent, or at least in tension, with the
problematic nature Hegel ascribes to abstract labor. If Hegel really understood abstract labor as
posing no ethical threats, as principally characterizing the structuring role of exchange without
the intrusion of any serious ethical concerns, then his insistent concerns over its potential to
generate wide-spread social pathologies through worker deadening would be unintelligible. For
Hegel, the deadening of the laborer is not a contingent flaw in the application of abstract labor,
but inherent within the very logic of abstract labor itself. Thus, just as in the case of poverty, the
issues arising from abstract labor cannot be mitigated by restrictions and checks imposed
externally by other social institutions, leaving Hegel with a less pleasant view of abstract labor
than Neuhouser’s interpretation suggests. For these reasons, we ought to reject Neuhouser’s
neutral and exchange-based view of abstract labor and adopt the labor-procedural account we
have been developing here.
4.2

Bildung and Ethical Subjectivity
Despite our rejection of Neuhouser’s interpretation of abstract labor, we must agree with

his insistence on the primacy of its subject-forming aspects in coming to an understanding of
Hegel’s mature social theory. Hegel calls this subject-formation Bildung, and often talks of its
“infinite” (PR §187R) and “absolute” (PR §20) value, as well as its “infinite importance” (PR
§209R). Hegel’s Bildung, however, refers both to the education of the individual over the course
of her life as well as to the progressive and formative development of society writ large. Put
simply, Hegel’s Bildung has both subjective and objective components, applying to both the
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cultivation of subjectivity and the objective institutions responsible for this cultivation.65
Developing the German philosophical trends of his time,66 Hegel’s notion of Bildung concerns
not so much institutionalized educational apparatuses and practices (although these are contained
within it as a part, such as in Hegel’s discussions of the education of children [EM §521; PR
§§173–175]) as much as the formation of subjectivity in general.67 These ordinary educational
practices of “child-rearing, upbringing, and school education” are usually addressed by the
German word Erziehung, not Bildung.68 One can even read the Philosophy of Right as a kind of
Bildungsroman or coming-of-age story in which the will and its institutional framework are
progressively enculturated into universality.69 From the perspective of the will, for example,
Hegel writes that “the particular self-consciousness” achieves substantiality and actuality in the
state “when this has been raised to its universality” through processes of education (PR §258).
However, the most important role of Bildung in the Philosophy of Right, I argue, is precisely its
role in the development of properly ethical subjectivity: the formative processes of the individual
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that shape her beliefs, attitudes, habits, and practices (what Hegel calls her “knowledge, volition,
and action”) into ones that are ethical and free (PR §187). In short, “education is the art of
making human beings ethical” (PR §151A).70
To begin our demonstration of this interpretation, we can first turn to an important
remark in the introduction to civil society in which Hegel characterizes Bildung as the “absolute
transition” to ethical subjectivity:
Education [Bildung], in its absolute determination, is therefore liberation and
work towards a higher liberation; it is the absolute transition to the infinitely
subjective substantiality of ethical life, which is no longer immediate and natural,
but spiritual and at the same time raised to the shape of universality. (PR §187R)
In raising individuals out of natural immediacy, Bildung is the process by which an
individual acquires a kind of universality or an ethical substantiality which is “infinitely
subjective.”71 As we have seen in our discussion of the reflective will, a key part of this infinite
subjectivity produced by Bildung is the will’s purification of the drives and the “formal
universality” that this purification confers, about which Hegel explicitly writes that “this
cultivation of the universality of thought is the absolute value of education” (PR §20).72 As the
concrete and ethical actualization of the purification and socialization of need, civil society thus
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comes to play a fundamental role for Hegel’s conception Bildung. In the context of civil society,
Bildung encapsulates
the process whereby [members of civil society’s] individuality and naturalness are
raised, both by natural necessity and by their arbitrary needs, to formal freedom
and formal universality of knowledge and volition, and subjectivity is educated in
its particularity.” (PR §187)
In this second passage, two key features of the Philosophy of Right’s definition of
Bildung emerge. First, subjectivity is educated in its particularity and not in its universality. It is
clear that by this Hegel does not mean that the result of education is somehow a form of
particularity, as this would contradict the raising of need to universality that constitutes Bildung
in the first place. Instead, subjectivity is educated in its particularity because it is educated
through its particularity: I obtain my practical education73 not by any explicit concern for the
universal, but instead through the following of my own particular interests. Thus, Hegel writes
that this education is unconscious in this sense as the universality acquired is “not present in the
consciousness of these members of civil society as such” (PR §187). The kind of universalizing
practical Bildung engendered through the movement of civil society occurs behind the backs of
its members, “since these persons as such have in their consciousness and their aim not the
absolute unity, but their own particularity and their being-for-self” (EM §523).
Second, the universality which the individual acquires through civil society’s educational
processes is not universality as such but formal universality. In the preceding section, Hegel
makes clear that this formal universality is a deficient form of universality: “This unity [of the
principles of particularity and universality] is not that of ethical identity, because at this level of
division, the two principles are self-sufficient; and for the same reason, it is present not as
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freedom, but as the necessity whereby the particular must rise to the form of universality and
seek and find its subsistence in this form” (PR §186). Formal universality appears to the
individual as necessity, not freedom, and thus cannot be the final word on the rational
actualization of substantial freedom that Hegel understands himself to be demonstrating in the
Philosophy of Right. What is left open in this passage, however, is what, precisely, are these
particulars that rise to formal universality. But, as we have already seen, the particulars that
Hegel has in mind are the needs of individuals; these are raised to social universality because
their satisfaction is mediated through labor and abstraction and this mediation thereby confers on
them objectivity and the “form of universality or of the understanding” since they are now
systematically integrated into the totality of social need (PR §187R).74 In universalizing social
need, Bildung also coterminates with the universalization project that is the “end of reason”
altogether: “[reason’s] end is… to work to eliminate natural simplicity, whether as passive
selflessness or as barbarism of knowledge and volition – i.e., to eliminate the immediacy and
individuality in which spirit is immersed, so that this externality may take on the rationality of
which it is capable” (PR §187R).
What is still unclear, however, is why this universalization of social need through
abstraction that Hegel calls Bildung constitutes a formal as opposed to a concrete universality.
One answer to this question is historical-linguistic. In her discussion of the religious roots of
Bildung in nineteenth century German philosophy, Kristin Gjesdal points out that Bildung first
gained a foothold in German philosophy through its theological association with the noun Bild
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(image, picture, figure) and the verb bilden (to form, shape, or cultivate).75 Both of these
etymological siblings of Bildung invoke a sense of formalism, and so it’s no surprise that Hegel,
the great thinker of the German vernacular, would preserve the formality of whatever is
described by his conception of Bildung. Thus, in the Encyclopaedia, we find Hegel writing that
the “habit of abstraction in enjoyment, information, and behavior,” i.e., the ethical disposition
cultivated in civil society, “constitutes culture [Bildung] in this sphere,—formal culture
[Bildung] in general” (EM §525). Given its linguistic context, it is difficult to imagine Hegel
claiming that such a habit counts as material or concrete Bildung.
However, Hegel invokes more than simple linguistic similarity in his justification of
Bildung’s formality, although his articulation of this reasoning is somewhat disjointed. We can
see his argument most clearly by contrasting Bildung’s actualization of “formal freedom” (PR
§187) with the state’s actualization “concrete freedom”:
Concrete freedom requires that personal individuality and its particular interests
should reach their full development and gain recognition of their right for itself
(within the system of the family and of civil society), and also that they should, on
the one hand, pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and
on the other, knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as
their own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate end. (PR §260)
In this passage introducing the internal constitution of the state, Hegel emphasizes that
concrete freedom involves not only the full development of personal individuality and realized
interests (presumably the result of Bildung), but also (1) the taking of a voluntary and active
concern for the universal interest and (2) the knowing of this universal interest as an essential part
of one’s own ethical subjectivity. That is, what concrete freedom requires beyond civil society’s
formal freedom is the explicit and conscious concomitance of the individual and the general will,
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which, while requiring the processes of Bildung as a part, is not reducible to its processes alone.76
Bildung is formal, then, because the universal that it raises the market-subject to does not require
that she “[act] in conscious awareness of this end” (PR §260). Bildung, in other words, fully
develops the “principle of subjective freedom” (PR §316A) but fails to explicitize this ethical
subjectivity as a self-consciously grounded in the state—what we may call for the sake of
dialectical symmetry its failure to develop the ‘principle of objective freedom’.
That the source of Bildung’s formality lies in its lack of the kind of “substantial unity”
realized only by the state has several implications for its significance in Hegel’s theory of labor
and civil society. First, echoing his prior discussion of the formal universality of the reflective
will (PR §21), Hegel claims that Bildung involves the universalization of natural and immediate
need into the form of thought, the form of universality, and the form of the understanding (PR
§217R). Second, Bildung is the becoming-objective of this reflective will: “it is through this
work of education that the subjective will attains objectivity even within itself” (PR §187R).
Third and as a result of these two points, Bildung involves the ethical recuperation of selfexternalization and self-alienation inherent not just in nature or the immediate will but in all
human activity whatsoever (“for in their actions, human beings are necessarily involved in
externality” [PR §119A]). The goal of Bildung is to sublate this externality “in which spirit is
immersed” so that “spirit is at home and with itself in this externality as such,” thus
simultaneously preserving and transcending externality within the modern ethical subject. Thus
Hegel writes that “the ethical is a subjective disposition”—i.e., the result of the processes of

For Hegel, particularity can only preserve itself through its ascent to universality: “This form of
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individuality; and, since it is from particularity that universality receives both the content which fills it
and its infinite self-determination, particularity is itself present in ethical life as free subjectivity which as
infinite being-for-itself” (PR §187R).
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Bildung—“but of that right which has being in itself”—i.e., a disposition given objective
existence within an ethical state (PR §141R). Fourth, Bildung as the cultivation of formal
universality, requires the adherence to and recognition of universal principles. By giving a
Dasein or existence to the concept of right, Bildung ensures that right is “universally recognized,
known, and willed, and, in which, through the mediation of this quality of being known and
willed, it has validity and objective actuality” (PR §209). Finally, as a corollary of Bildung’s
revelation of the universality and existence of right, Hegel notes (and implicitly affirms civil
society’s affinity with liberalism) that the Bürger of civil society is treated as a “universal
person,” i.e., in abstraction from their particular identity: “It is part of education [Bildung]… that
I am apprehended as a universal person, in which all are identical. A human being counts as such
because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.”
(PR §209R). In sum, Bildung’s formality plays many roles in the unfolding of civil society and
thus is essential for explicating its central role as well as its ethical limitations in Hegel’s social
theory.
Both of these two larger features of Bildung as it is developed in the context of modern
civil society—viz., that practical Bildung’s universality is both unconscious and formal—expose
a subjective deficiency in civil society. It is for this reason that Hegel characterizes civil society
as the moment of loss in ethical life, in which ethical subjectivity loses a part of its ethicality:
civil society is the “system of ethical life, lost in its extremes” of particularity and universality
(PR §184), it “affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and
ethical corruption common to both,” (PR §185) and it “particularizes itself abstractly into many
persons… which, in independent freedom and as particulars, are for themselves… [and] it thus
initially loses its ethical determination” (EM §523). The key to understanding civil society’s
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ethical loss is that this loss is the result of the specific kind of Bildung (one of formal
universality) generated through its reciprocity of needs and labor and that, as a result, this
deficient Bildung is ultimately the consequence of the processes of abstract labor. While this
universality marks an important ethical achievement in this sphere, it is also the site of its
deficiency. Bildung, in other words, is not just the descriptive source of ethical subjectivity, but
is also the normative juncture at which civil society is ethically evaluated, the rubric under which
civil society can be shown to be both entirely necessary and utterly insufficient for the
actualization of social freedom.
These remarks provide a sketch of Hegel’s theory of Bildung as it pertains to his mature
political thought at the most general level. However, it is no coincidence that Hegel provides his
most thorough discussion of Bildung in the Philosophy of Right within his development of civil
society and the system of needs. As our above exegesis already indicates, Hegel explicitly
connects labor and Bildung; Bildung’s liberation is always a matter of “hard work” (PR §187)
and labor always develops a particular shape of subjectivity. Ultimately, we must read labor as
contributing in a privileged way to the cultivation ethical subjectivity.77 More specifically,
modern civil society requires that individuals obtain a practical education (praktische Bildung),
through which they learn to act “in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of
this continuum” (PR §187) thereby enabling them to mesh with the “arbitrary wills of others”
(PR §197). Hegel glosses this idea of a practical education as the acquisition of a special habit:
“the habit of being occupied” (PR §197).

Consistent with my thesis but drawing from a different text, Avineri writes that, for Hegel, “labour is
the universal link among men, 'labour is the universal interaction and education [Bildung] of man… a
recognition which is mutual, or the highest individuality'. In labour, man becomes 'a universal for the
other, but so does the other'” (Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 89, citing Hegel, Schriften zur
Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, ed. Georg Lasson [Felix Meiner, 1913], 430 and 428).
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4.3

Habit, Second Nature, and Practical Education
It is because of this entanglement with practical education that Hegel’s concept of habit is

closely related to his concepts of labor and Bildung.78 While the category of habit (EM §§409–
10) is officially developed under the heading of subjective spirit (EM §§387–482), falling within
the sections on anthropology (EM §§388–412), and thus substantially precedes the sections on
objective spirt (EM §§483–552), habit plays a central role in Hegel’s account of the “bodiliness”
and subject-forming aspects of practical Bildung (i.e., “the subjective substantiality of this
bodiliness”), and, as a consequence, is essential to his account of the ethicality of labor (EM
§409). The general formula of habit is the becoming-immediate of a universal determination of
the will—its “being-together-with-one’s-own-self” or its “untroubled being-together-with-itself
in all the particularity of its content” (EM §410A). Habit describes the subject’s double process
of denaturalization (that it “makes itself into an abstract universal being”79) and renaturalization
(that it “reduces the particularity of feelings… to a determination that just is”80) (EM §410).81
This intensely dialectical nature of habit is celebrated by Hegel, which he admits as “one of the
most difficult determinations” of the Philosophy of Spirit (EM §410R).82 Nonetheless, Hegel

For a detailed account of the centrality of Hegel’s concept of habit in his conception of human
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utilizes this notion of habit in the Philosophy of Right to importantly theorize the embodied form
of subject-formation produced through civil society’s mediation of social need by the process of
labor (practical education) as well as the immediacy of spiritually-produced freedom achieved in
ethical life (second nature).
Hegel develops habit in the Encyclopaedia through three moments: hardening,
indifference towards satisfaction, and dexterity. By the time habit is developed in the form of
dexterity, “bodiliness is then rendered pervious, made into an instrument, in such a way that as
soon as the representation is in me (e.g. a sequence of musical notes), the physical body too,
unresistingly and fluently, has expressed it correctly” (EM §410R). Dexterity or the “production
of habit” is obtained by the individual through “practice,” understood as the repetition of the
“self-incorporation of the particularity of bodiliness of the determinations of feeling into [one’s]
being” (EM §410). As a consequence of her habituated dexterity, the individual becomes
liberated from her absorption in sensation or the matter-at-hand, moving within them and
“without sensation or consciousness,” and thus becomes open to other simultaneous activities,
and this openness constitutes one aspect of the individual’s freedom in habit (EM §410).83 The
second aspect of habit’s contribution to subjective freedom is its appropriation of the individual’s
natural mode of existence, which, in habit, is “reduced to his mere being” (EM §410R).
Moreover, Hegel makes it clear that habit applies not just to bodily activity such as the human
being’s upright posture or the act of seeing, but also to thinking itself (he uses the example of
writing), and goes so far as to say that “habit is the most essential feature of the existence of all

“In this way the soul has the content in possession, and contains it in such a way that in such
determinations it is not actually sentient, it does not stand in relationship to them by distinguishing itself
from them, nor is it absorbed in them, but it has them in itself and moves in them, without sensation or
consciousness. The soul is free of them, in so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them; while it
exists in these forms as its possessions, it is as the same time open to other activity and occupations, in
the sphere of sensation and the mind’s consciousness in general” (EM §410, emphasis mine).
83
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mental life in the individual subject” since it concretizes immediacy not merely “as abstract
inwardness, cut off from action and actuality,” but rather in the subject’s “very being,” thereby
translating thought into existence within the individual (EM §410). However, the subject of habit
is in other respects made unfree. For one, habit takes on what Hegel calls a “relative” form
which, as in the case of bad habits, can, depending on their content, oppose the actualization of
freedom.84 Second, habits, by becoming in some sense part of the individual’s natural existence,
also entail a kind of irreversible desensitization or indifference to that which one is habituated
and so reduces one’s capacity to react freely. Nevertheless, in the final analysis it is the liberating
aspects of habit which predominate in the anthropological and social contexts: “the essential
determination is the liberation from sensation that man gains through habit” (EM §410R).
It is because of this relative formality that habit recapitulates the same formal
universality—what Hegel in this context also calls “abstract universality” or the “universality of
reflection”—that we saw in Bildung and in labor (EM §410). Habit, as “the truth of the
particular,” produces a subjectivity that becomes “a simple relation of ideality to itself, formal
universality” and such that it is in habit in which the subject’s self-feeling is “posited as this
universality… that is for itself” (EM §409). In virtue of being for-itself, habit’s universality is
indifferent to the specific determinations of the feelings and drives which constitute self-feeling:
“this universality is not the content-packed truth of the determinate sensations, desires, etc., for
their content does not yet come into consideration here” (EM §409). Also like Bildung, habit’s
universality is unconscious since its “sublation… of the particularity of bodiliness… is the

“In habit man’s mode of existence is natural, and for that reason he is unfree in it; but he is free in so far
as the natural determinacy of sensation is by habit reduced to his mere being, he is no longer different
from it, is indifferent to it, and so no longer interested, engaged, or dependent with respect to it. This
unfreedom in habit is partly just formal, pertaining only to the being of the soul; partly only relative, in so
far as it really arises only in the case of bad habits, or in so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose”
(EM §410R).
84
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entirely pure intuition, unconscious, but the foundation of consciousness” (EM §409R). While
habit is essential for the operation of thought, it is itself never the explicit object or result of
conceptual cognition; habit is only ever the object or result of practical activity, in which it will
always remain unconscious.
Associated with habit is the notion of a second nature, which appears in the Philosophy of
Right as an ethical imperative, demanding that we distance ourselves from our immediate, ‘first’
nature, and that we produce within ourselves a “second nature” (PR §4; cf PR §151 and PR
§268A).85 While the category of second nature is underdeveloped in the Philosophy of Right, in
the Encyclopedia Hegel clarifies its ethical role by explicitly identifying it with habit:
Habit has rightly been called a second nature: nature, because it is an immediate
being of the soul, a second nature, because it is an immediacy posited by the soul,
incorporating and moulding the bodiliness that pertains to the determinations of
feeling as such and to the determinacies of representation and of the will in so far
as they are embodied. (EM §410)
Habit is second nature because it evokes both immediacy (nature) and self-positedness
(secondness), where this self-positing is the will’s reforming of its own bodiliness and the
embodiment of its own determinations. Hegel is aware of the standard problem with the idea of
second nature, which often leaves in lingering ambiguity the implied ‘first nature’ which it
supersedes. Hegel characterizes this first nature as one in which an individual is determined
purely by natural immediacy, with no intervention by thought, spirit, or cognition when he
writes:
Habit is not an immediate, first nature, dominated by the individuality of
sensations. It is rather a second nature posited by soul. But all the same it is still a
nature, something posited that assumes the shape of immediacy, an ideality of
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beings that is itself still burdened with the form of being, consequently something
not corresponding to free mind, something merely anthropological. (EM §410A)
In this passage, Hegel directly accepts the paradox of second nature by insisting that habit
both is and is not nature. As we saw in habit’s simultaneous affirmation of freedom and
unfreedom, second nature refers to both the supersession of the tyranny of sensation and the
sphere of immediacy or the “form of being” (liberation from the merely anthropological). Second
nature thus designates a certain kind of freedom that is unconscious, embodied, obtainable only
through activity, thereby opening an individual to more complex and properly spiritual tasks.
Habit’s emergence as second nature is crucial for understanding Hegel’s insistence on the
subjective immediacy of ethical life, that is, the seeming peculiarity that in ethical life “selfconscious freedom becomes nature” (EM §513) such that this denaturalized/renaturalized
freedom is actualized “without reflective choice” (EM §514).86 Genuine ethical life must always
exist in the shape of a habituated and self-produced immediacy, and it is in this form (as opposed
to that of a purely reflective kind) that Hegel privileges in his account of ethical life’s
actualization of freedom: “the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of
spirit produced from within itself as a second nature” (PR §4). Hegel reiterates this point later,
writing that “the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the
original and purely natural will and is the all-pervading soul, significance, and actuality of
individual existence (PR §151).
The ethical centrality of this peculiar mediated immediacy that is habit/second nature
arises most prominently in Hegel’s defense of patriotism as the “political disposition” most
appropriate for, and grounded on the truth of, the state:
86

Hegel also characterizes the realization of ethical life as second nature as the unity of the concept of the
will with its existence as an individual will: “Ethical life is the unity of the will in its concept and the will
of the individual” (PR §33A).
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The political disposition, i.e. patriotism in general, is certainty based on truth and
volition which has become habitual. This disposition is in general… the
consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and
contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state), and… as a
result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my
consciousness of this, I am free. (PR §268)
Membership in an ethical state is, on its own, not enough for securing freedom; nor is a
merely reflective acknowledgement of the state’s universality. I am subjectively free only by
means of having a particular habit, patriotism, which must be grounded on the truth, i.e., the
objectively existing state. This political disposition requires not only that I cognitively recognize
my particular interests as realized only within that of the universal, not based on the truth of this
realization alone, but in which this recognition is embodied and cultivated through practical
activity and labor as an immediate ethical nature or life, the outcome of which is practical
Bildung.
Returning to the notion of practical education, we will recall that the practical Bildung
acquired through labor in civil society manifests itself in the individual’s “habit of abstraction”
(EM §525), “habit of being occupied” (PR §197), or “habit of right in general, of the ethical”
(EM §410R). This habit has the form of universality, on the one hand, and “the content of
freedom,” on the other (EM §410R).
Hegel distinguishes the practical education obtained in civil society from “theoretical
education,” which “involves not only a variety of representations and items of knowledge, but
also an ability to form such representations and pass from one to the other in a rapid and versatile
manner, to grasp complex and general relations, etc.”—in other words, theoretical education
encompasses all the usual aims of traditional education: an individual’s capacity to think
critically, draw on a broad body of knowledge, and communicate with others (and hence
theoretical education “also includes language”) (PR §197). While Hegel is not explicit on this
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point, he likely assumes that theoretical education is the concern of the standard institutions we
often refer to by the word education (primary and secondary education, and so on).
Practical education, on the other hand, is the institutional concern and product of civil
society. Rather than cultivating the intellect’s understanding, practical education produces the
habit of being active or, as Ruda puts it, the habit of having habits:87
Practical education through work consists in the self-perpetuating need and habit
of being occupied in one way or another, in the limitation of one’s activity to suit
both the nature of the material in question and, in particular, the arbitrary will of
others, and in a habit, acquired through this discipline, of objective activity and
universally applicable skills. (PR §197)
Practical education is not the formation of any and all habits, however, but the habits that
have the kind of objectivity gained through the mediating processes of the system of needs, i.e.,
the habit of practical education must be one of contributing to the satisfaction of the needs of
others, it must be socially necessary. As Hegel states in the addition, practical education entails
both a degree of objective success in one’s manipulating the material in question as well as a
subjective lack of resistance, for example, in the arbitrary will of others, in achieving one’s ends:
“A worker can be described as skilled if he produces the thing as it ought to be, and if, in his
subjective actions, he encounters no resistance to the end he is pursing” (PR §197). This skill
requirement can only be satisfied through specialization in one sphere of labor, so, in turn,
practical education also requires that everyone join an estate: “the individual attains actuality
only by entering into existence in general, and hence into determinate particularity; he must
accordingly limit himself exclusively to one of the particular spheres of need” (PR §207). Thus,
while civil society’s contribution to the actualization of freedom demands that everyone obtain
practical Bildung, a habit of having habits, the exact content of this Bildung is both limited by the
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requirement that these habits satisfy the social needs of others but otherwise indeterminate,
differing depending upon the estate that the individual belongs to, since the estates are
differentiated according to “their corresponding means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction,
variety of labor, and theoretical and practical education” (PR §201; cf. EM §527).
One key implication of this conception of practical Bildung is that while all labor and all
human activity produce habits and contribute to the construction of one’s second nature (hence
the possibility of bad habits and their characterization as relative and formal universities), not all
of these habits are adequate to the concept of true ethical life or, in other words, are normatively
desirable from the perspective of the actualization of social freedom. While Hegel clearly
theorizes a plurality of such ethical subjectivities in the diversity of his three estates—indeed, a
necessary and immanent plurality and differentiation given that any “organic whole” must be
“composed of different elements” (PR §200R)—the habituated second nature produced by the
Bürger’s labor must fall within a relatively narrow range if it is to be ethical: she must satisfy the
needs of others in a socially necessary way through labor, she must acquire skill in manipulating
her object, she must habituate herself to and therefore embody herself in this active labor, and
she must, by doing all of this, come to unconsciously reconcile her own particular interests and
volition with those of the universal, society writ large.88 To fail at any one of these tasks is to fail
at actualizing practical Bildung and thus also to construct a deficiency in the center of social
freedom itself, which, by way of Hegel’s logic of actuality, requires not the mere existence of
practical Bildung but its actualization through its unification of universality and particularity.89
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It is precisely the coterminance of the principle of subjectivity or the interests of the individuals with
the collective interests of the state that ensure its strength and stability (PR §265A).
89
Hegel makes this argument with the ethical evaluation of an empirical state, but it can also be made
analogously for any constituent aspect of this totality. If we take up any given empirical state, then it may
very well be, as Hegel puts it, a “bad state” which is purely finite or existent (Existenz) as opposed to an
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To summarize, we can say that civil society contributes to ethicality or the actualization
of social freedom through its development of practical Bildung or habitual ethical subjectivity,
and that this practical Bildung is in turn the subjective result of civil society’s labor, which, in
contrast to other kinds of labor throughout Hegel’s writings, “links selfishness with the
universal” (PR §201A). It is for this reason that Anders Bartonek is correct in pointing out that
civil society’s labor in its educational role simultaneously transcends and preserves its function
as an economic category and is the true locus of Hegel’s ethical concerns about labor in the
Philosophy of Right. Hegel’s philosophy of labour, Bartonek writes, is one of a “cultivating
Bildung” as a “theory of the human self as a product of its labour,” and thus necessarily “is a
form of labour that transcends the mere economic scope of labour.”90 It is precisely labor’s
subject-forming powers, theorized by Hegel through habit and Bildung, that justifies the central
importance of labor in the system of needs and in ethical life in general and that provides some
rough criteria for distinguishing between those ethical subjectivities adequate to ethical living
(and thus too the labor processes responsible for them) from those which do not.

ethical state which is “infinite within itself” or actual (PR §270A). “Actuality is always the unity and
particularity, the resolution of universality into particularity; the latter then appears to be self-sufficient,
although it is sustained and supported only by the whole. If this unity is not present, nothing can be
actual, even if it may be assumed to have existence. A bad state is one which merely exists… but it has no
actuality” (PR §270A). Thus, like the bad state, a bad Bildung would not be the inexistence of education
but rather an education which fails to unify universality and particularity and thus is not an actualized
education (and consequently does not contribute to the actualization of freedom).
90
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5

THE PROBLEM OF ABSTRACT LABOR AND THE SOLUTION OF MACHINE
AUTOMATION
So far, we have seen how labor, as the source of the Bürger’s practical Bildung and habitual

second nature, is the central locus of civil society’s ethicality. We have also seen how abstract
labor characterizes a specific labor processes associated with modern factory production, and
that this process leads to the deadening of the laborer’s ethical subjectivity as opposed to its
development. However, two questions still linger unaddressed. First, exactly how is abstract
labor responsible for the deadening of the laborer in a way that is so problematic for practical
Bildung? What about the mechanistic labor makes it so deadening, so antithetical to ethical
subject-formation? Second, how does Hegel’s purposed solution—the use of machines to
automate abstract labor and thus eliminate its necessity—actually solve the problem of
Abstumpfung given, on the hand, the ethical requirement of laboring for the actualization of
one’s freedom, and, on the other hand, the various impasses he identifies for any intervention
into the autonomous sphere of civil society? In asking these two questions, we must now shift
our focus away from Hegel’s description of the functioning of civil society to the more
evaluative and normative dimensions of this aspect of his social theory.
5.1

The Problem of Abstract Labor: The Abstumpfung of the Laborer
Let us turn to our first question: what are, and what are the sources of, the deadening effects

on subject-formation produced by mechanized abstract labor found in modern factories,
according to Hegel? Although this question appears to be straightforward one, and despite
having many of its central theoretical elements in place in his conceptual development of
Bildung and habit, Hegel does not deliver an explicit connection of these deadening effects with
industrial labor within the text of the Philosophy of Right—such an account must be
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reconstructed. Although it is tempting to see a statement of these damages in Hegel’s discussions
of poverty and the rabble (PR §§241–246), we ought to resist such a reading. The problem with
allowing Hegel’s general remarks about poverty and the rabble to stand in as a discussion of
abstract labor’s Abstumpfung is that Hegel rigorously distinguishes between these three groups,
i.e., between the poor, the rabble, and the industrial workforce. What Hegel says about the
rebellious disposition of the unemployed and indignant rabble, for example, does not apply to the
poor or to the factory workers (as it is precisely this anti-ethical subjective attitude that uniquely
identifies the rabble). Likewise, not all of the employed poor will find themselves occupied in
abstract factory labor, such as the peasantry. And, finally, Hegel is aware that some factory
workers are paid quite well, putting them squarely outside the realm of poverty.91 Thus, when
Hegel writes that some of those involved in “particular work” are cut off from the full freedom
offered by modern civil society, he is not directly addressing the deadening produced by abstract
labor:
When the activity of civil society is unrestricted, it is occupied internally with
expanding its population and industry. – On the one hand… the accumulation of
wealth increases. … But on the other hand, the specialization and limitation of
particular work also increase, as do likewise the dependence and want of the class
[Klasse] which is tied to such work; this in turn leads to an inability to feel and
enjoy the wider freedoms, and particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil
society. (PR §243)92
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For example, in his 1817–1818 Heidelberg lectures Hegel explicitly mentions England as a country in
which some factory laborers are well-paid and thus not members of the poor: “A factory can thrive in a
country where there is great poverty and people have to make do with little; but in England the cost of
labor is exceedingly high, and yet the factories prosper” (Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political
Science: The First Philosophy of Right, trans. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson [University of
California Press, 1995], 177)
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population and industry. […] The other side is the subdivision and restriction of particular work. This
results in the dependence and distress of the class [Klasse] tied to work of that sort, and these again entail
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Looking carefully at the problems emphasized in this passage, we see that none of them are quite
the same as the deadening subjectivity induced by abstract labor. My inability to participate in
the “wider freedoms” and “spiritual advantages” of civil society is not due to the specific
character of my labor activity per se, of its “specialization and limitation” itself. Rather, its real
cause is my complete dependence on wage labor93 and my economic impoverishment resulting
from the large-scale social organization of labor and the distribution of its output.94 Hegel’s use
Klasse instead of Stand to describe these workers signifies that he is here describing abstract
labor as such as not merely divided labor, and so this dependence-distress is concerns only the
former. The quality of my labor itself has yet to come into play; we must look elsewhere for an
account of abstract labor’s contribution to Abstumpfung.
Given Hegel offers no explicit account of the origin and meaning of the abstract laborer’s
deadening, my contention is that we can reconstruct it by firstly looking at Hegel’s remarks on
Abstumpfung in his early Jena manuscripts and his later lectures on the Philosophy of Right and
secondly by reviewing his critique of the mechanistic view of the state which provides an
analogy to his less explicit critique of mechanized labor. These two sources show us that
Abstumpfung, for Hegel, is simply what happens when the laborer fails to acquire practical
Bildung, and has its origin in her inability to participate in the labor process as a differentiated
organ within a rationally ordered whole.

the inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially the spiritual benefits of civil society”
(Houlgate and Knox, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, 220f).
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Marx would later theorize this dependency as the formal subsumption of labor under capital (Marx,
Capital, 645f, 1019–1038, cf. also the chapters on primitive accumulation, 873–931).
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Houlgate and Knox’s translation more explicitly constructs the causal chain that I am asserting here.
They make it clear that the dependence and poverty of the workers “entail” their inability to enjoy the
spiritual benefits of civil society.
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Already in his early Jena writings, Hegel is centrally concerned with the subjective
effects of modern manufacturing on the emerging laboring Klasse.95 In the Jena manuscript of
1803–1804, Hegel writes of the “vengeance” of abstract labor, noting that this new form of labor
invokes a dialectic inversion of the Promethean subjugation of nature though labor. Through the
technologically mediated consummation of humanity’s domination over nature, the laborer now
finds himself in a world in which “the more he takes from nature, the more he subjugates it”
through modern techniques of production, “the baser he becomes himself.”96 In this kind of
industrialized factory labor, Hegel continues, “the human being becomes more and more
machine-like, dull, spiritless” to the point that “the spiritual element, the self-conscious
plentitude of life, becomes empty activity.” Hegel makes much the same point in his 1805–1806
Jena manuscript, where he writes that in the factory “man’s labor itself becomes entirely
mechanical… but the more abstract [his labor] becomes, the more he himself is mere abstract
activity.”97 The factory laborer loses part of his “rich comprehension,” and instead “his dull work
limits him to one point.98 Thus, with the advent of abstract labor, the 1803–1804 manuscript
concludes:
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Work thus becomes absolutely more and more dead, it becomes machine-labor,
the individual’s own skill becomes infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the
factory worker is degraded to the utmost level of dullness.”99
Moreover, in his earliest known social-theoretic writings from 1802, Hegel writes that
“deadening” of labor occurs when it becomes “more mechanical, because variety is excluded
from it and so it becomes itself something more universal, more foreign to [the living] whole.100
Lastly, in the 1805–06 manuscript Hegel even recognizes the essential precarity and thus latent
poverty of the factory worker:
In the individual’s skill is the possibility of sustaining his existence. This is
subject to all the tangled and complex contingency in the [social] whole. Thus a
vast number of people are condemned to a labor that is totally stupefying,
unhealthy and unsafe—in workshops, factories, mines, etc.—shrinking their
skills. And entire branches of industry, which supported a large class of people,
go dry all at once because of [changes in] fashion or a fall in prices due to
inventions in other countries, etc.—and this huge population is throw into helpless
poverty.101
In these various passages from his Jena period, Hegel states, consistently with his theory of
Bildung, that abstract labor is responsible for forming a specific kind of laborer-subject, namely
one whose life has been deadened through repetitive labor, whose practical activity has become
empty, and whose integration within the organic whole has been irrevocably lost. Insofar as the
abstract laborer is involved in machine-like labor, she herself becomes “baser” and “dull,” and
her self-conception “degraded” and “one-sided.” In addition, the abstract laborer cannot be held
responsible for her own deadening, as her lot is not chosen but the blind result of a complex web
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of contingencies, both on the subjective side of her natural proclivities, upbringing, and course of
life as well as on the objective side of world-market’s volatility.102
These themes of subjective depravity as a result of abstract labor are repeated in Hegel’s
later lectures on the Philosophy of Right in Heidelberg and Berlin. In the former, Hegel writes
that “a factory presents a sad picture of the deadening of human beings” and, most importantly,
paints this deadening as a broad degeneracy of their ethical subjectivity: “which is also why on
Sundays factory workers lose no time in spending and squandering their entirely weekly
wages.”103 Much is the same in his many lectures on the Philosophy of Right in Berlin, where
Hegel can be found claiming, for example, that “the more developed the division of labor is, the
more spiritless and dull it becomes” (VPR I, 31) and “that through the perfection of labor, [labor]
dulls the workers… it is only the work of the understanding which is thus cultivated, modified”
(VPR IV, 503).105 Thus, throughout the entirety of Hegel’s social and political thought (although
certainty less explicit in the Philosophy of Right) lies the central insight that the tendency toward
abstract labor in modern civil society leads to the deadening of the very subject-formation that it
is supposed to bring about; its essential contribution to free and ethical living turns out to be, for
factory workers at least, its generation of unfreedom. The abstract laborer does not cultivate
herself through her labor, but rather becomes narrow-sighted, spiritless, and deadened, unable to
conceive of herself as a properly ethical agent.
These various remarks on Abstumpfung are, however, just that—remarks. They still bear
the mark of their original purpose as lecture notes, and, as such, have yet to be systematically
connected by Hegel with the rest of his social theory. They state clearly that factory labor
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deadens the worker, and that this deadening is a truncation of the laborer’s Bildung. However,
they leave open the question of why this labor is deadening, and thus falsely make Hegel’s
criticism of factory labor appear similar to something like alienation critique. The issue with
abstract factory labor is not that it is divided labor, i.e., that it requires worker specialization and
limitation in one’s activity and, as a consequence of this, separates the laborer from the final
product and the circumstances of its use and produces inequalities of pay, activity, recognition,
and so on. If this were so, then it would be nearly the whole of civil society that found itself
undertaking empty and machine-like activity. Instead, the key to the difference between socially
necessary divided labor and anti-ethical abstract factory labor as such is the latter’s character as
machine-like and mechanistic, which is not at all a necessity in the general division of labor and
is conceptually distinct from the laborer’s alienation. But we get no account of mechanism in the
Philosophy of Right, not even a reference to its development as a category in the logic. However,
we do get some remarks on mechanistic approaches to the state, and how these differ from
Hegel’s organismic approach, which, once pieced together and then juxtaposed with his lecture
comments on Abstumpfung and his theory of Bildung, provide a sufficient understanding of
mechanism for explicating abstract labor’s deadening of the worker.107

For a book-length treatment of the role of mechanism in Hegel’s social theory, see Nathan Ross, On
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There are few views of the state that Hegel criticizes more vehemently than the that which
conceives of the state as a mechanism solely for preserving private self-interests, enforcing
abstract rights, and protecting private property (PR xvi). In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel
characterizes the mechanistic conception of the state as:
That representation of the state according to which its sole determination is to
protect and secure the life, property, and arbitrary will of everyone, in so far as the
latter does not infringe the life, property, and arbitrary will of others; in this view,
the state is merely an arrangement dictated by necessity. (PR §270R, translation
modified)
While the mechanistic state’s protection of formal liberties is an important aspect of the ethical
state, the mechanistic conception of the state mistakes civil society as the ethical state as such,
and it likewise mistakes formal freedom as substantial freedom. It places “beyond the state” the
sort of actualized freedom that is supposed to be realized by the intersubjective social
collective—“the higher spiritual element of what is true in and for itself”—and thus the concept
of the state becomes “completely deprived of its proper ethical character” (PR §270R). Such is
the state conceived as an external mechanism for the preservation of private property. But “the
state is an organism”—not a machine—Hegel asserts (PR §269A). The intelligibility of all of
Hegel’s theory of the modern state depends upon this distinction, but for our purposes it suffices
to focus on the two important junctures in the Philosophy of Right where Hegel explicitly
contrasts the mechanistic state from the organic and rational one: first, in specifying the intimate
relationship between the state and the political disposition of its citizenry and, second, in
defending his view of the division of political powers across the governmental branches of the
executive, the legislature, and the monarchy (what Hegel calls the “internal constitution” of the
state).
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As we have seen, patriotism or political disposition is the subjective correlate of the state’s
objective institutions and refers to a specific kind of habit in which “in the normal conditions and
circumstances of life, [one] habitually knows that the community is the substantial basis and end
[of oneself]” (PR §268R). This habit, I have argued, is the combined result of the practical
Bildung obtained by laboring in civil society and the theoretical Bildung acquired through
traditional education. Since an essential component of this habit is the integration of my own
particular interests and subjective freedom within the universal interests and actuality of the
state, it provides a particularly colorful example of the kind of organically unified totality that is
missing in abstract factory labor.
In his long remark contrasting the state from the church, Hegel notes that both of these
institutions, in a certain sense, contain “doctrine” insofar as each requires the codification of
“whatever it recognizes as valid” into the “form of thought as law” (PR §270R). Moreover,
Hegel continues, these two doctrines can, and often do, come into conflict with one another,
since, on the one hand, the doctrine of the church cannot be a merely “internal matter” of
conscience—as if it were completely independent of the material and ethical concerns of the
state—because this internal matter of conscience “is in fact an expression… of a content which is
intimately connected, or even directly concerned, with ethical principles and the laws of the
state” (PR §270R). On the other hand, the state, understood as an organism and not a machine,
must concern itself with the subjective disposition of its citoyens:
Since the state is not a mechanism but the rational life of self-conscious freedom
and the system of the ethical world, the disposition, and so also the consciousness
of this disposition in principles, is an essential moment in the actual state. (PR
§270R)
Thus, the church and the state both make claims on the internal subjectivity of their constituents
and these claims may collide. (While Hegel does not mention civil society in this context—he
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instead considers the possibility of an independent scientific community colliding with the
state—we could also say the same about its status as an independent social institution and its
exclusive claim to molding the subjectivity of the Bürger.) Of course, for Hegel, the state must
triumph in this conflict as it is only through it that ethicality is actualized.108 However, what is
more important for our purposes is to see that it is precisely the state’s sensitivity to and
responsibility for developing the ethical disposition of its citizens that makes it count as “not a
mechanism.” Moreover, this disposition is, crucially, self-conscious and grounded in intelligible
and rationally organized principles. The rational state’s incorporation of its members’
subjectivities in its own actuality starkly contrasts it from the state qua mechanism that remains
external and indifferent to these subjective inner-workings, concerned only with the protection of
the formal liberties of all, which in actuality reduces to the substantial freedom of the few.109
We find a similar characterization of mechanism in Hegel’s discussion of the division of
political powers, although by quite a different path. In this context, Hegel insists that the
separation of political power among the executive, legislative, and monarchical branches of
government cannot be one of competing interests and competition, i.e., it cannot be based on the
model of civil society. Such a differentiation without explicit interconnection and unity is unfit
for the rational state:

Further on in the remark Hegel reminds us that the Philosophy of Right has already “established the
truth [of the proposition] that spirit, as free and rational, is inherently ethical, that the true Idea is actual
rationality, and that it is this rationality which exists as the state” (PR §270R).
109
Hegel associates the mechanistic view of the state with the English and harbors no illusions that these
protections serve the substantial freedom of the many: “Take the case of England which, because private
persons have a predominate participation in state affairs, has been regarded as having the freest of all
constitutions. Experience shows that this country—as compared with the other culturally advanced states
of Europe—is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation, in the right and the freedom of
property, in arrangements for art and science, etc., and that objective freedom i.e. rational right, is rather
sacrificed to formal right and to particular private interest” (EM §544R).
108
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The constitution is rational in so far as the state differentiates and determines its
activity within itself in accordance with the nature of the concept. It does so in
such a way that each of the powers in question is in itself the totality, since each
contains the other moments and has them active within it, and since all of them, as
expressions of the differentiation of the concept, remain wholly within its ideality
and constitute nothing but a single individual whole. (PR §272).110
Since the very notion of a state requires that its constitutive powers work in unity with and for
each other, the mechanistic state does not, strictly speaking, exist. If state politics become
nothing more than “means of coercion” for individual or group private interests, then the state
has already dissolved:
there would no longer be any government, only parties, and the only remedy for it
would be the domination and suppression of one party by the other. To represent
organization of the state as a mere intellectual constitution, i.e., as the mechanism
of a balance of powers external to each other in their interior, goes against the
fundamental Idea of what a state is. (EM §544R)
For Hegel, such a dissolution of the state through mechanization is realized in history by the
despotic feudal monarchies, which, by striving for power and committing acts of violence,
present not a sequence of ethical states but a “succession of rebellions” (PR §286R). The
violence and instability of the medieval polis, Hegel argues, is the result of its mechanical
separation, as opposed to organic differentiation-integration, of political power:
The reason for this is that, in conditions such as these, the division of political
business is purely mechanical, with its different parts distributed among vassals,
pashas, etc., so that the difference [between these elements] is not one of
determination and form, but merely of greater or lesser power. Thus, each part
maintains itself alone, and in so doing, it promotes only itself and not the others
along with it, and has within itself the complete set of moments which it requires
for independence and self-sufficiency. In an organic relationship, the units in
question are not parts but members, and each maintains the others while fulfilling

See also PR §286: “Each member [of the whole], in maintaining itself independently, thereby also
maintains the others in their own distinct character within the rational organism.”
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its own function; the substantial end and product of each is to maintain the other
members while simultaneously maintaining itself. (PR §286R)111
Following Hegel’s contrast in this passage between organic relation and mechanical division, we
can say that in the former the well-being of each component part is preserved in the functioning
of the whole despite its specialization: success or failure in the wider telos is reflected in each,
and no component can be left to degrade or perish—it is the tide that really lifts all boats. As a
result of this unity, there is a fluid reciprocity between each element despite their specialization.
Moreover, since each is “in itself the totality,” all of the components participate both in the
determining of the organism’s ends as well as an instrument in its proper functioning.
Although Hegel’s critique of the mechanistic conception of the state has no direct bearing
on abstract labor per se, it provides a helpful analogy for explaining the way in which abstract
factory labor deadens the worker. If we combine these insights with those of Hegel’s lectures and
our previous treatment of his theory of Bildung, we arrive at a reconstruction of what is wrong
with abstract labor, and, more importantly, an idea of the forms of labor which would avoid these
pitfalls. Putting the issue negatively, we can say that abstract factory labor deadens the laborer
because: through the labor process, the laborers are sacrificed, not preserved; the laborers do not
participate in ends-setting, only the holders of capital do (and even they are subject to the profit
motive); the laborers are not conscious of the rational principles which organize their activity;
the laborers do not acquire security in their social station or stability in their financial situation;
there is no guarantee that their labor is actually socially necessary; and, finally, the laborers are
not integrated into the universality of the state, they exist as mere accidents of it, since their work
has stifled their physical and intellectual capacities and so too their substantial freedom.
See also PR §300A: “The representation of the so-called independence of powers contains the basic
error that the powers should be independent yet mutually limiting. If they are independent, however, the
unity of the state, which is the supreme requirement, is destroyed.” (PR §300A, see also §301A).
111
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5.2

Hegel’s Solution to the Problem of Abstract Labor: Machine Automation
Nearly all of Hegel’s discussions of the deadening caused by abstract labor are

immediately followed by the consolation that the very principles governing civil society which
give rise to this regrettable process of mechanical labor also tend towards its dissolution through
machine automation.114 In his Jena writings, for example, we find Hegel claiming that
this deadening of mechanical labor directly implies the possibility of cutting
oneself off from it altogether; for the labor here is wholly quantitative without
variety, and since its subsumption in intelligence is self-cancelling, something
absolutely external, a thing, can then be used owing to its self-sameness both in
respect of its labor and its movement. It is only a question of finding for it an
equally dead principle of movement, a self-differentiating power of nature like the
movement of water, wind, stream, etc., and the tool passes over into the
machine.115
And again in 1805–1806:
Man’s labor itself becomes entirely mechanical… and consequently he is in a
position to withdraw himself from labor and to substitute for his own activity that
of an external nature. He needs more motion, and this he finds in external nature.
In other words, pure motion is precisely the relation of the abstract forms of space
and time—the abstract external activity, the machine. (Hegel and Human Spirit,
121)
The redemptive character of machine automation is even more emphasized in his 1806–1807
Heidelberg lectures:
A factory presents a sad picture of the deadening of human beings… But once
factory work has reached a certain degree of perfection, of simplification,
mechanical human labor can be replaced by the work of machines, and this is
what usually comes about in factories. In this way, through the consummation of
this mechanical progress, human freedom is restored… Human beings are

Waszek rightly notes that the idea of machine automation “re-occurs frequently in Hegel’s writings,
both earlier and later” (Waszek, “The Division of Labor,” 73).
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Hegel, System of Ethical Life, 117f.
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accordingly first sacrificed, after which they emerge through the more highly
mechanized conditions as free once more.116
The preparation of specific means calls for a particular aptitude and familiarity,
and individuals must confine themselves to only one of these. This gives rise to
the division of labor, as a result of which labor or work becomes less concrete in
character, becomes abstract, homogeneous, and easier, so that a far greater
quantity of products can be prepared in the same time. In the final stage of
abstractness, the homogeneity of labor makes it mechanical, and it becomes
possible to install machines in the place of people, replacing human motion by a
principle of natural motion that is harnessed to secure uniformity and to promote
human ends.117
Just as in the case of Abstumpfung, the corresponding claims about machine automation
in Hegel’s more mature political writings are less grandiose. The first comes from the last
sentence of §198 in the Philosophy of Right: “The abstraction of production makes work
increasingly mechanical, so that the human being is eventually able to step aside and let a
machine take his place.” The same idea is presented in an extended but similar way in the
1824/25 lectures, in which Hegel claims that the “further consequence” of the mechanization of
labor “is that man can finally leave it to machines.” His lecture claim is slightly stronger, as there
the “perfection of labor” not only enables but requires automation that “in the end makes man
superfluous,” such that civil society tends towards the elimination of harmful abstract labor
(VPR IV, 503f). Nonetheless, in all of his later presentations of machine automation, Hegel only
hints as the redemptive capacity of machine automation and is perhaps less optimistic about the
degree of its uptake in actually existing factories. What is constant throughout all presentations,
though, is machine automation’s privileged role as the solution to abstract labor.
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Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, 117.
Ibid., 175.
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We can now turn to our second question: If Hegel understood the deadening effects of
abstract labor so acutely, what kind of reconciliation do they receive in his mature theory of the
state? An adequate answer to this kind of question has long puzzled commentators of the
Philosophy of Right, who have often wondered whether Hegel adequately replies to the very
threats to ethical life he identifies within civil society.118 The question of whether Hegel’s hope
for machine automation is consistent is a subset of this larger issue. Machine automation is
Hegel’s response to one particular threat of civil society: the deadening effect associated with
abstract labor and the new kind of deformed subjectivity it produces. A successful reply to such
critics would require as a component an adequate reconciliation of these two phenomena.
Part of Hegel’s response to the subject-formation problems of abstract labor involves
reference to the larger societal structures and institutions outside of the labor process itself. This
is Hegel’s systematic response, in which he leans on the regulative practices of the police and
corporations and the recognitive and unifying practices of the state in order to remedy the ills
produced by the system of needs. The general argumentative strategy is to admit that abstract
labor opposes the actualization of freedom in the lives of workers if such labor is conceived only
within the narrow sphere of the marketplace. However, the argument continues, looking out from
the global and unified perspective of the state we recognize that abstract labor is in fact not
merely a necessary evil but instead a constitutive element of our freedom in some way or
another. Hegel’s model for this kind of systematic is his defense of the state’s engagement in
war, involving the individual’s sacrifice of security in life and property receives a “higher
significance” recognizable only from outside the sphere of civil society—namely, from the more

For example, Wood argues that the corporations are Hegel’s solution to poverty while Avineri argues
that Hegel offers no solution to the problem of poverty (Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 237–255;
Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State Modern State, 109 and 143–154).
118
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complete and universal perspective of the state (PR §324R). Analogously, by taking herself to be
in the first instance a citizen of a rational state (as opposed to a satisfier of needs), the abstract
factory laborer could come to see her dull labor as an acceptable political practice aligned with
the realization of her substantial freedom.
Certainly, this kind of argumentation plays some role in Hegel’s defense of labor in civil
society. However, we ought to set aside the systematic response for reasons of consistency and
charity. First and most significantly, if Hegel really thought larger societal structures were
sufficient for the defense of abstract labor, then he would have had no need for mobilizing the
solution of machine automation in the first place. Hegel’s insistence across all his political
writings on the replacement of living labor with machines as the solution to the problem of
abstract labor makes it unlikely that he thought such a systematic response was sufficient in this
case. Second, we may doubt the success of Hegel’s systematic responses in general, particularly
as he employs them in defense of the necessity of social ills (e.g., poverty, the rabble,
unemployment, or war). In the case of Abstumpfung, such a response is even self-defeating, as
the very educational processes of abstract labor foreclose the possibility of taking up this wider
perspective. Thus, if Hegel’s solution to the problems of abstract labor relies primarily on such
systematicity, then, for most contemporary readers, it is unlikely to succeed.
We may also wonder whether Hegel’s purposed solution of replacing abstract labor with
machines is inconsistent with the fundamental role he gives labor in forming ethical subjectivity,
Bildung. As labor is replaced by machines, the educational opportunities available through labor
are, it seems, diminished in equal degree. However, this inconsistency hinges on interpreting
Hegel as claiming that all labor in civil society cultivates well-formed subjectivity. In fact, and
as we have seen, Hegel’s underlying claim is simply that this is not true; not all labor cultivates
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well-formed subjectivity, even in labor’s rational reconstruction in thought. Through his concept
of practical Bildung, Hegel has instead developed a loose set of criteria for identifying which
kinds of labor fulfill the ethical promises of civil society. While these criteria are admittedly
constructed partly out of his conception of ethical and free human living that finds its articulation
throughout the entirety of the Philosophy of Spirit, they are also in many ways immanent to the
principles of civil society and the system of needs themselves.
The kind of subject-formation brought about by abstract labor is, in fact, opposed to the
kind of particularizing practical education Hegel’s sees as the proper outcome for labor. Hegelian
Bildung aims to generate the kind of “subjectivity” that “must be developed as a living whole”
(PR §260A), meaning that each social position the subject occupies—mother, worker, consumer,
citizen, daughter, property-owner, student, and so on—contributes to the ethical, ‘truly human’
formation of the subject as a whole. The normative and ethical role allotted to labor in civil
society is to ensure that this “subjectivity is educated in its particularity” (PR §187), which the
subject accomplishes through her actualization of her self-conception as a worker involved in a
meaningful and socially productive labor process, a process in which the subject’s required
specialization does not prohibit her wider awareness of the rationality of the whole. So
understood, Hegel is just correctly applying his own set of ethical criteria when he celebrates the
inevitable replacement of spiritless, anti-ethical abstract labor with machines, as this opens up
the possibility for these laborers to take part in the kinds of labor Hegel thinks ethically
appropriate for all citizens of a modern state.
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